[5f. The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature](#_Toc148546341)

[OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 3:13-14; 6:2-3; 15:3; 20:7; 34:5-7,14 / *Leviticus,* 19:12; 21:6; 22:32 */ Deuteronomy,* 5:11; 28 :58-59 / *II Samuel, 22:2-3; 23:3-(D) II Kings,* 22:2-3; 23:3 / *Psalms,* 8 esp 8:9; 68:4; 83:15-18; 135 :13-(D) *Psalms,* 8 esp 8:10; 67:5; 82:r6-19; 134:13 / *Isaiah,* 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 48:2 ; 51:15; 54:5; 63:16-(D) *Isaias,* 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 48 :2; 51:15; 54:5; 63: 16 / *Jeremiah,* 10:16; 16:21; 23:6; 31:35; 32:18; 33:2; 50:34;](#_Toc148546342)

[(5. Symbolism in theology and religion. 5f. The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature.)](#_Toc148546343)

[APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 14:20-21-(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 14:20-21](#_Toc148546344)

[NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew,* 6:9/ *Luke,* 11:2 / *Revelation,* 1:8; 21:6; 22:13-(D) *Apocalypse,* 1:8; 21:6; 22:13](#_Toc148546345)

[5 AESCHYLUS: *Agamemnon* [160-183] 53d-54a](#_Toc148546346)

[6 HERODOTUS: *History,* BK II, 49d-50a; 60a-d; 80a-c; BK IV, 134a](#_Toc148546347)

[7 PLATO: *Cratylus,* 91c-d; 93d-97d](#_Toc148546348)

[18 AUGUSTINE: *Christian Doctrine,* BK I, CH 6 626a-b](#_Toc148546349)

[19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 1-2 15c-16a; A 3, REP I 16a-d; A 6, REP I 18c-19a; Q 4, A I, REP I 20d-21b; A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP I 24b-25a; Q 13 62b-75b; Q 14, A I, REP 1-2 75d-76c; PART I-II, Q 14, A I, REP 2 677b-678a; Q 47, A I, REP I 819c-820b](#_Toc148546350)

[21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a; XXVI [124-138] 147a-b; XXX [34-99] 152a-d](#_Toc148546351)

[23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART I, 54b; 78d-79a; 79d-80b passim; PART II, 162a-163b; PART III, 172d-173a; 183d-184a](#_Toc148546352)

[25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays,* 238d-239b](#_Toc148546353)

[28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 443c](#_Toc148546354)

[31 SPINOZA: *Ethics,* PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-363c](#_Toc148546355)

[34 NEWTON: *Principles,* BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 370a-371a](#_Toc148546356)

[35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding,* BK II, CH XIII, SECT 18 152a-c](#_Toc148546357)

[38 ROUSSEAU: *Social Contract,* BK IV, 435b](#_Toc148546358)

[42 KANT: *Pure Reason,* 176a-b](#_Toc148546359)

[47 GOETHE: *Faust,* PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b esp [3455-3457] 84b](#_Toc148546360)

[51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace,* BK VI, 248d](#_Toc148546361)

# **5f. The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature**

# **OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 3:13-14; 6:2-3; 15:3; 20:7; 34:5-7,14 / *Leviticus,* 19:12; 21:6; 22:32 */ Deuteronomy,* 5:11; 28 :58-59 / *II Samuel, 22:2-3; 23:3-(D) II Kings,* 22:2-3; 23:3 / *Psalms,* 8 esp 8:9; 68:4; 83:15-18; 135 :13-(D) *Psalms,* 8 esp 8:10; 67:5; 82:r6-19; 134:13 / *Isaiah,* 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 48:2 ; 51:15; 54:5; 63:16-(D) *Isaias,* 41:4; 42:8; 44:6; 47:4; 48 :2; 51:15; 54:5; 63: 16 / *Jeremiah,* 10:16; 16:21; 23:6; 31:35; 32:18; 33:2; 50:34;**

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 3:13-14

**13**Moses said to God: Lo, I shall go to the children of Israel, and say to them: The God of your fathers hath sent me to you. If they should say to me: What is his name? what shall I say to them?

**14**God said to Moses: I AM WHO AM. He said: Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS, hath sent me to you.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 6:2-3

**2**And the Lord spoke to Moses, saying: I am the Lord,

**3**That appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God Almighty; and my name ADONAI I did not shew them.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 15:3

**3**The Lord is as a man of war, Almighty is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 20:7

**7**Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain: for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that shall take the name of the Lord his God in vain.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus,* 34:5-7,14

**5**And when the Lord was come down in a cloud, Moses stood with him, calling upon the name of the Lord.

**6**And when he passed before him, he said: O the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, patient and of much compassion, and true,

**7**Who keepest mercy unto thousands: who takest away iniquity, and wickedness, and sin, and no man of himself is innocent before thee. Who renderest the iniquity of the fathers to the children, and to the grandchildren, unto the third and fourth generation.

**14**Adore not any strange god. The Lord his name is Jealous, he is a jealous God.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Leviticus,* 19:12

**12**Thou shalt not swear falsely by my name, nor profane the name of thy God. I am the Lord.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Leviticus,* 21:6

**6**They shall be holy to their God, and shall not profane his name: for they offer the burnt offering of the Lord, and the bread of their God, and therefore they shall be holy.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Leviticus,* 22:32

**32**Profane not my holy name, that I may be sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel. I am the Lord who sanctify you,

OLD TESTAMENT: *Deuteronomy,* 5:11

**11**Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain: for he shall not be unpunished that taketh his name upon a vain thing.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Deuteronomy,* 28:58-59

**58**If thou wilt not keep, and fulfill all the words of this law, that are written in this volume, and fear his glorious and terrible name: that is, The Lord thy God:

**59**The Lord shall increase thy plagues, and the plagues of thy seed, plagues great and lasting, infirmities grievous and perpetual.

OLD TESTAMENT: *II Samuel, 22:2-3-(D) II Kings,* 22:2-3

**2**And he said: The Lord is my rock, and my strength, and my saviour.

**3**God is my strong one, in him will I trust: my shield, and the horn of my salvation: he lifteth me up, and is my refuge: my saviour, thou wilt deliver me from iniquity.

OLD TESTAMENT: *II Samuel, 23:3-(D) II Kings,* 23:3

**3**The God of Israel said to me, the strong one of Israel spoke, the ruler of men, the just ruler in the fear of God.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Psalms,* 8 -(D) *Psalms,* 8

**8**Unto the end, for the presses: a psalm of David.

**2**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in the whole earth! For thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens.

**3**Out of the mouth of infants and of sucklings thou hast perfected praise, because of thy enemies, that thou mayst destroy the enemy and the avenger.

**4**For I will behold thy heavens, the works of thy fingers: the moon and the stars which thou hast founded.

**5**What is man that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man that thou visitest him?

**6**Thou hast made him a little less than the angels, thou hast crowned him with glory and honour:

**7**And hast set him over the works of thy hands.

**8**Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover the beasts also of the fields.

**9**The birds of the air, and the fishes of the sea, that pass through the paths of the sea.

**10**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth!

OLD TESTAMENT: *Psalms,* esp 8:9-(D) *Psalms,* esp 8:10

**10**O Lord our Lord, how admirable is thy name in all the earth!

OLD TESTAMENT: *Psalms,* 68:4-(D) *Psalms,* 67:5

**5**Sing ye to God, sing a psalm to his name, make a way for him who ascendeth upon the west: the Lord is his name. Rejoice ye before him: but the wicked shall be troubled at his presence,

OLD TESTAMENT: *Psalms,* 83:15-18-(D) *Psalms,* 82:16-19

**16**So shalt thou pursue them with thy tempest: and shalt trouble them in thy wrath.

**17**Fill their faces with shame; and they shall seek thy name, O Lord.

**18**Let them be ashamed and troubled for ever and ever: and let them be confounded and perish.

**19**And let them know that the Lord is thy name: thou alone art the most High over all the earth.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Psalms,* 135 :13-(D) *Psalms,* 134:13

**13**Thy name, O Lord, is for ever: thy memorial, O Lord, unto all generations.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 41:4

**4**Who hath wrought and done these things, calling the generations from the beginning? I the Lord, I am the first and the last.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 42:8

**8**I the Lord, this is my name: I will not give my glory to another, nor my praise to graven things.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 44:6

**6**Thus saith the Lord the king of Israel, and his redeemer the Lord of hosts: I am the first, and I am the last, and besides me there is no God.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 47:4

**4**Our redeemer, the Lord of hosts is his name, the Holy One of Israel.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 48:2

**2**For they are called of the holy city, and are established upon the God of Israel: the Lord of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 51:15

**15**But I am the Lord thy God, who trouble the sea, and the waves thereof swell: the Lord of hosts is my name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 54:5

**5**For he that made thee shall rule over thee, the Lord of hosts is his name: and thy Redeemer, the Holy One of Israel, shall be called the God of all the earth.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Isaiah,* 63:16

**16**For thou art our father, and Abraham hath not known us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us: thou, O Lord, art our father, our redeemer, from everlasting is thy name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 10:16

**16**The portion of Jacob is not like these: for it is he who formed all things: and Israel is the rod of his inheritance: the Lord of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 16:21

**21**Therefore, behold I will this once cause them to know, I will shew them my hand and my power: and they shall know that my name is the Lord.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 23:6

**6**In those days shall Juda be saved, and Israel shall dwell confidently: and this is the name that they shall call him: the Lord our just one.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 31:35

**35**Thus saith the Lord, who giveth the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars, for the light of the night: who stirreth up the sea, and the waves thereof roar, the Lord of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 32:18

**18**Thou shewest mercy unto thousands, and returnest the iniquity of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them: O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is thy name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 33:2

**2**Thus saith the Lord, who will do, and will form it, and prepare it, the Lord is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 50:34

**34**Their redeemer is strong, the Lord of hosts is his name: he will defend their cause in judgment, to terrify the land, and to disquiet the inhabitants of Babylon.

# **(5. Symbolism in theology and religion. 5f. The names of God: the use of words to signify the divine nature.)**

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 51:19

**19**The portion of Jacob is not like them: for he that made all things he it is, and Israel is the sceptre of his inheritance: the Lord of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 10:16

**16**The portion of Jacob is not like these: for it is he who formed all things: and Israel is the rod of his inheritance: the Lord of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 16:21

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OLD TESTAMENT: *Jeremiah,* 51:19

**19**The portion of Jacob is not like them: for he that made all things he it is, and Israel is the sceptre of his inheritance: the Lord of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Daniel, 7:9,13*

**9**I beheld till thrones were placed, and the Ancient of days sat: his garment was white as snow, and the hair of his head like clean wool: his throne like flames of fire: the wheels of it like a burning fire.

**13**I beheld therefore in the vision of the night, and lo, one like the son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and he came even to the Ancient of days: and they presented him before him.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Amos,* 4:13

**13**For behold he that formeth the mountains and createth the wind, and declareth his word to man, he that maketh the morning mist, and walketh upon the high places of the earth: the Lord the God of hosts is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Amos,* 5:8

**8**Seek him that maketh Arcturus, and Orion, and that turneth darkness into morning, and that changeth day into night: that calleth the waters of the sea, and poureth them out upon the face of the earth: The Lord is his name.

OLD TESTAMENT: *Amos,* 9:6

**6**He that buildeth his ascension in heaven, and hath founded his bundle upon the earth: who calleth the waters of the sea, and poureth them out upon the face of the earth, the Lord is his name.

# **APOCRYPHA: Wisdom of Solomon, 14:20-21-(D) OT, Book of Wisdom, 14:20-21**

**20**And the multitude of men, carried away by the beauty of the work, took him now for a god that a little before was but honoured as a man.

**21**And this was the occasion of deceiving human life: for men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood.

# **NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew,* 6:9/ *Luke,* 11:2 / *Revelation,* 1:8; 21:6; 22:13-(D) *Apocalypse,* 1:8; 21:6; 22:13**

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew,* 6:9

**9**Thus therefore shall you pray: Our Father who art in heaven, hallowed be thy name.

NEW TESTAMENT: *Luke,* 11:2

**2**And he said to them: When you pray, say: Father, hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come.

NEW TESTAMENT: *Revelation,* 1:8

**8**I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, saith the Lord God, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty.

NEW TESTAMENT: *Revelation,* 21:6

**6**And he said to me: It is done. I am Alpha and Omega; the beginning and the end. To him that thirsteth, I will give of the fountain of the water of life, freely.

NEW TESTAMENT: *Revelation,* 22:13

**13**I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end.

# **5 AESCHYLUS: *Agamemnon* [160-183] 53d-54a**

Zeus—whosoe'er He be, Whose state excels

All language syllables,

Knowing not so much

As whether He love that name or love it not;

Zeus—while I put all knowledge to the touch,

And all experience patiently assay,

I find no other name to heave away

The burden of unmanageable thought.

The sometime greatest wrangler of them all

Hath wrestled to his fall;

His day is done,

He hath no name, his glory's lustreless.

He that doth all outwrestle, all outrun,

Hath whelmed the next that rose up huge and strong.

But if Zeus' triumph be thy victory-song,

Thou shalt be founded in all Soothfastness.

He maketh men to walk in Wisdom's ways;

In Suffering He lays

Foundations deep

Of Knowledge. At the heart remembered Pain,

As of a wound that bleeds, waketh in sleep.

Though we reject her, Wisdom finds a road.

Then 'tis a gift untenderly bestowed

By Throned Spirits that austerely reign.

# **6 HERODOTUS: *History,* BK II, 49d-50a; 60a-d; 80a-c; BK IV, 134a**

6 HERODOTUS: *History,* BK II, 49d-50a

4. Now with regard to mere human matters, the accounts which they gave, and in which all agreed, were the following. The Egyptians, they said, were the first to discover the solar year, and to portion out its course into twelve parts.. They obtained this knowledge from the stars. (To my mind they contrive their year much more cleverly than the Greeks, for these last every other year intercalate a whole month, but the Egyptians, dividing the year into twelve months of thirty days each, add every year a space of five days besides, whereby the circuit of the seasons is made to return with uniformity.) The Egyptians, they went on to affirm, first brought into use the names of the twelve gods, which the Greeks adopted from them; and first erected altars, images, and temples to the gods; and also first engraved upon stone the figures of animals. In most of these cases they proved to me that what they said was true. And they told me that the first man who ruled over Egypt was Men, and that in his time all Egypt, except the Thebaic canton, was a marsh, none of the land below Lake Moeris then showing itself above the surface of the water. This is a distance of seven days' sail from the sea up the river.

5. What they said of their country seemed to me very reasonable. For any one who sees Egypt, without having heard a word about it before, must perceive, if he has only common powers of observation, that the Egypt to which the Greeks go in their ships is an acquired country, the gift of the river. The same is true of the land above the lake, to the distance of three days' voyage, concerning which the Egyptians say nothing, but which is exactly the same kind of country.

The following is the general character of the region. In the first place, on approaching it by sea, when you are still a day's sail from the land, if you let down a sounding-line you will bring up mud, and find yourself in eleven fathoms' water, which shows that the soil washed down by the stream extends to that distance.

6 HERODOTUS: *History,* BK II, 60a-d

50. Almost all the names of the gods came into Greece from Egypt. My inquiries prove tnat they were all derived from a foreign source, and my opinion is that Egypt furnished the greater number. For with the exception of Neptune and the Dioscuri, whom I mentioned above, and Juno, Vesta, Themis, the Graces, and the Nereids, the other gods have been known from time immemorial in Egypt. This I assert on the authority of the Egyptians themselves. The gods, with whose names they profess themselves unacquainted, the Greeks received, I believe, from the Pelasgi, except Neptune. Of him they got their knowledge from the Libyans, by whom he has been always honoured, and who were anciently the only people that had a god of the name. The Egyptians differ from the Greeks also in paying no divine honours to heroes.

51. Besides these which have been here mentioned, there are many other practices whereof I shall speak hereafter, which the Greeks have borrowed from Egypt. The peculiarity, however, which they observe in their statues of Mercury they did not derive from the Egyptians, but from the Pelasgi; from them the Athenians first adopted it, and afterwards it passed from the Athenians to the other Greeks. For just at the time when the Athenians were entering into the Hellenic body, the Pelasgi came to live with them in their country, whence it was that the latter came first to be regarded as Greeks. Whoever has been initiated into the mysteries of the Cabiri will understand what I mean. The Samothracians received these mysteries from the Pelasgi, who, before they went to live in Attica, were dwellers in Samothrace, and imparted their religious ceremonies to the inhabitants. The Athenians, then, who were the first of all the Greeks to make their statues of Mercury in this way, learnt the practice from the Pelasgians; and by this people a religious account of the matter is given, which is explained in the Samothracian mysteries.

52. In early times the Pelasgi, as I know by information which I got at Dodona, offered sacrifices of all kinds, and prayed to the gods, but had no distinct names or appellations for them, since they had never heard of any. They called them gods (Θεοι disposers), because they had disposed and arranged all things in such a beautiful order. After a long lapse of time the names of the gods came to Greece from Egypt, and the Pelasgi learnt them, only as yet they knew nothing of Bacchus, of whom they first heard at a much later date. Not long after the arrival of the names they sent to consult the oracle at Dodona about them. This is the most ancient oracle in Greece, and at that time there was no other. To their question, "Whether they should adopt the names that had been imported from the foreigners?" the oracle replied by recommending their use. Thenceforth in their sacrifices the Pelasgi made use of the names of the gods, and from them the names passed afterwards to the Greeks.

53. Whence the gods severally sprang, whether or no they had all existed from eternity, what forms they bore—these are questions of which the Greeks knew nothing until the other day, so to speak. For Homer and Hesiod were the first to compose Theogonies, and give the gods their epithets, to allot them their several offices and occupations, and describe their forms; and they lived but four hundred years before my time, as I believe. As for the poets who are thought by some to be earlier than these, they are, in my judgment, decidedly later writers. In these matters I have the authority of the priestesses of Dodona for the former portion of my statements; what I have said of Homer and Hesiod is my own opinion.

54. The following tale is commonly told in Egypt concerning the oracle of Dodona in Greece, and that of Ammon in Libya. My informants on the point were the priests of Jupiter at Thebes. They said "that two of the sacred women were once carried off from Thebes by the Phoenicians, and that the story went that one of them was sold into Libya, and the other into Greece, and these women were the first founders of the oracles in the two countries." On my inquiring how they came to know so exactly what became of the women, they answered, "that diligent search had been made after them at the time, but that it had not been found possible to discover where they were; afterwards, however, they received the information which they had given me.”

6 HERODOTUS: *History,* BK II, 80a-c

144. Of such a nature were, they said, the beings represented by these images—they were very far indeed from being gods. However, in the times anterior to them it was otherwise; then Egypt had gods for its rulers, who dwelt upon the earth with men, one being always supreme above the rest. The last of these was Horus, the son of Osiris, called by the Greeks Apollo. He deposed Typhon, and ruled over Egypt as its last god-king. Osiris is named Dionysus (Bacchus) by the Greeks.

145. The Greeks regard Hercules, Bacchus, and Pan as the youngest of the gods. With the Egyptians, contrariwise, Pan is exceedingly ancient, and belongs to those whom they call "the eight gods," who existed before the rest. Hercules is one of the gods of the second order, who are known as "the twelve"; and Bacchus belongs to the gods of the third order, whom the twelve produced. I have already mentioned how many years intervened according to the Egyptians between the birth of Hercules and the reign of Amasis. From Pan to this period they count a still longer time; and even from Bacchus, who is the youngest of the three, they reckon fifteen thousand years to the reign of that king. In these matters they say they cannot be mistaken, as they have always kept count of the years, and noted them in their registers. But from the present day to the time of Bacchus, the reputed son of Semele, daughter of Cadmus, is a period of not more than sixteen hundred years; to that of Hercules, son of Alcmena, is about nine hundred; while to the time of Pan, son of Penelope (Pan, according to the Greeks, was her child by Mercury), is a shorter space than to the Trojan war, eight hundred years or thereabouts.

146. It is open to all to receive whichever he may prefer of these two traditions; my own opinion about them has been already declared. If indeed these gods had been publicly known, and had grown old in Greece, as was the case with Hercules, son of Amphitryon, Bacchus, son of Semele, and Pan, son of Penelope, it might have been said that the last-mentioned personages were men who bore the names of certain previously existing deities. But Bacchus, according to the Greek tradition, was no sooner born than he was sewn up in Jupiter's thigh, and carried off to Nysa, above Egypt, in Ethiopia; and as to Pan, they do not even profess to know what happened to him after his birth. To me, therefore, it is quite manifest that the names of these gods became known to the Greeks after those of their other deities, and that they count their birth from the time when they first acquired a knowledge of them. Thus far my narrative rests on the accounts given by the Egyptians.

147. In what follows I have the authority, not of the Egyptians only, but of others also who agree with them. I shall speak likewise in part from my own observation. When the Egyptians regained their liberty after the reign of the priest of Vulcan, unable to continue any while without a king, they divided Egypt into twelve districts, and set twelve kings over them. These twelve kings, united together by intermarriages, ruled Egypt in peace, having entered into engagements with one another not to depose any of their number, nor to aim at any aggrandisement of one above the rest, but to dwell together in perfect amity. Now the reason why they made these stipulations, and guarded with care against their infraction, was because at the very first establishment of the twelve kingdoms an oracle had declared — "That he among them who should pour in Vulcan's temple a libation from a cup of bronze would become monarch of the whole land of Egypt." Now the twelve held their meetings at all the temples.

6 HERODOTUS: *History,* BK IV, 134a

58. Such then are the rivers of chief note in Scythia. The grass which the land produces is more apt to generate gall in the beasts that feed on it than any other grass which is known to us, as plainly appears on the opening of their carcases.

59. Thus abundantly are the Scythians provided with the most important necessaries. Their manners and customs come now to be described. They worship only the following gods, namely, Vesta, whom they reverence beyond all the rest, Jupiter, and Tellus, whom they consider to be the wife of Jupiter; and after these Apollo, Celestial Venus, Hercules, and Mars. These gods are worshipped by the whole nation: the Royal Scythians offer sacrifice likewise to Neptune. In the Scythic tongue Vesta is called Tahiti, Jupiter (very properly, in my judgment) Papceus, Tellus Apia, Apollo (Etosyrus, Celestial Venus Artimpasa, and Neptune Thamimasadas. They use no images, altars, or temples, except in the worship of Mars; but in his worship they do use them.

60. The manner of their sacrifices is everywhere and in every case the same; the victim stands with its two fore-feet bound together by a cord, and the person who is about to ofTer, taking his station behind the victim, gives the rope a pull, and thereby throws the animal down; as it falls he invokes the god to whom he is offering; after which he puts a noose round the animal's neck, and, inserting a small stick, twists it round, and so strangles him. No fire is lighted, there is no consecration, and no pouring out of drink-offerings; but directly that the beast is strangled the sacrificer flays him, and then sets to work to boil the flesh.

# **7 PLATO: *Cratylus,* 91c-d; 93d-97d**

7 PLATO: *Cratylus,* 91c-d

Her. And what are the traditions?

Soc. Many terrible misfortunes are said to have happened to him in his life-last of all, came the utter ruin of his country: and after his death he had the stone suspended (ταλανεία) over his head in the world below-all this agrees wonderfully well with his name. you might imagine that some person who wanted to call him ταλάντατοϛ (the most weighted down by misfortune), disguised the name by altering it into Tantalus; and into this form, by some accident of tradition, it has actually been transmuted. The name of Zeus, who is his alleged father, [396] has also an excellent meaning, although hard to be understood, because really like a sentence, which is divided into two parts, for sone call him Zena (Ζῇνα), and use the one half, and others who use the other half call him Dia (Δία); the two together signify the nature of the God, and the business of a name, as we were saying, is to express the nature. For there is none who is more the author of life to us and to all, than the lord and king of all. Wherefore we are right in calling him Zena and Dia, which are one name, although divided, meaning the God through whom all creatures always have life (δί ὀν ξήν άεί πὰσι τοίϛ ξώσιν ίπάρχει). There is an irreverence, at first sight, in calling him son of Cronos (who is a proverb for stupidity)m and we might rather expect Zeus to be the child of a mighty intellect. Which is the fact: for this is the meaning of his father’s name: Κρόνοϛ quasi Κόροϛ (κορέω, to sweep), not in the sense of a youth, but signifying τό καθαρόυ καί άκήρατον τού νού, the pure and garnished mind (sc. άπὸ τού κορείν). He, as we are informed by tradition, was begotten of Uranus, rightly so called (άπὸ τού ὸράν τὰ ἂνω) from looking upwards; which, as philosophers tell us, is the way to have a pure mind, and the name Uranus is therefore correct. If I could remember the genealogy of Hesiod, I would have gone on and tried more conlcusions of the same sort on the remoter ancestors of the Gods,-then I might have seen whether this wisdom, which has come to me all in an instant, I know not whence, will or will not hold good to the end.

7 PLATO: *Cratylus,* 93d-97d

Soc. That may be variously interpreted and yet more variously if a little permutation is allowed. For some say that the body is the grave (σήμα) of the soul which may be thought to be buried in our present life; or again the index of the soul, because the soul gives indications to (σημαίνεϛ) the body; probably the Orphic poets were the inventors of the name, and they were under the impression that the soul is incarcerated, kept safe (σώμα, σώξηται), as the name σώμα implies, until the penalty is pad; according to this view, not even a letter of the word need be changed.

Her. I think, Socrates, that we have said enough of this class of words. But have we any more explanations of the names of the Gods, like that which you were giving of Zeus? I should like to know whether any similar principle of correctness is to be applied to them.

Soc. Yes, indeed, Hermogenes; and there is one excellent principle which, as men of sense, we must acknowledge,—that of the Gods we know nothing, either of their natures or of the names which they give themselves; but we are sure that the names by which they call themselves, whatever they may be, are true. And this is the best of all principles; and the next best is to say, as in prayers, that we will call them by any sort or kind of names or patronymics which they like, [401] because we do not know of any other. That also, I think, is a very good custom, and one which I should much wish to observe. Let us, then, if you please, in the first place announce to them that we are not enquiring about them; we do not presume that we are able to do so; but we are enquiring about the meaning of men in giving them these names,—in this there can be small blame. Her. I think, Socrates, that you are quite right, and I would like to do as you say.

Soc. Shall we begin, then, with Hestia, according to custom?

Her. Yes, that will be very proper.

Soc. What may we suppose him to have meant who gave the name Hestia?

Her. That is another and certainly a most difficult question.

Soc. My dear Hermogenes, the first imposers of names must surely have been considerable persons; they were philosophers, and had a good deal to say.

Her. Well, and what of them?

Soc. They are the men to whom I should attribute the imposition of names. Even in foreign names, if you analyze them, a meaning is still discernible. For example, that which we term ούσία is by some called έσία, and by others again ώσία. Now that the essence of things should be called έστία, which is akin to the first of these (έσία = έστία), is rational enough. And there is reason in the Athenians calling that karia which participates in ovata. For in ancient times we too seem to have said έσία for ούσία, and this you may note to have been the idea of those who appointed that sacrifices should be first offered to έστία, which was natural enough if they meant that carta was the essence of things. Those again who read ώσία seem to have inclined to the opinion of Heracleitus, that all things flow and nothing stands; with them the pushing principle (ώθούν) is the cause and ruling power of all things, and is therefore rightly called ώσία. Enough of this, which is all that we who know nothing can affirm. Next in order after Hestia we ought to consider Rhea and Cronos, although the name of Cronos has been already discussed. But I dare say that I am talking great nonsense.

Her. Why, Socrates?

Soc. My good friend, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

Her. Of what nature?

[402] Soc. Well, rather ridiculous, and yet plausible.

Her. How plausible?

Soc. I fancy to myself Heracleitus repeating wise traditions of antiquity as old as the days of Cronos and Rhea, and of which Homer also spoke.

Her. How do you mean ?

Soc. Heracleitus is supposed to say that all things are in motion and nothing at rest: he compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you cannot go into the same water twice.

Her. That is true.

Soc. Well, then, how can we avoid inferring that he who gave the names of Cronos and Rhea to the ancestors of the Gods, agreed pretty much in the doctrine of Heracleitus? Is the giving of the names of streams to both of them purely accidental? Compare the line in which Homer, and, as I believe, Hesiod also, tells of

*Ocean, the origin of Gods, and mother Tethys.*

And again, Orpheus says, that

*The fair river of Ocean was the first to many, and he espoused his sister Tethys, who was his mother's daughter.*

You see that this is a remarkable coincidence, and all in the direction of Heracleitus.

Her. I think that there is something in what you say, Socrates; but I do not understand the meaning of the name Tethys.

Soc. Well, that is almost self-explained, being only the name of a spring, a little disguised; for that which is strained and filtered (διατ τώμενον, ἠθούμενον) may be likened to a spring, and the name Tethys is made up of these two words.

Her. The idea is ingenious, Socrates.

Soc. To be sure. But what comes next?—of Zeus we have spoken.

Her. Yes.

Soc. Then let us next take his two brothers, Poseidon and Pluto, whether the latter is called by that or by his other name.

Her. By all means.

Soc. Poseidon is ποσίδευμοϛ, the chain of the feet; the original inventor of the name had been stopped by the watery element in his walks, and not allowed to go on, and therefore he called the rules of this element Poseidon: the ε was probably inserted as an ornament. Yet, perhaps, not so; but the name may have been originally written with a double λ and not with an σ, [403] meaning that the God knew many things (πολλά είδώϛ). And perhaps also he being the shaker of the earth, has been named from shaking (σείιν), and then π and δ have been added. Pluto gives wealth (πλούτοϛ), and his name means the giver of wealth, which comes out of the earth beneath. People in general appear to imagine that the term Hades is connected with the invisible (άειδέϛ); and so they are led by their fears to call the God Pluto instead.

Her. And what is the true derivation?

Soc. In spite of the mistakes which are made about the power of this deity, and the foolish fears which people have of him, such as the fear of always being with him after death, and of the soul denuded of the body going to him,¹ my belief is that all is quite consistent, and that the office and name of the God really correspond.

Her. Why, how is that?

Soc. I will tell you my own opinion; but first, I should like to ask you which chain does any animal feel to be the stronger? And which confines him more to the same spot,-desire or necessity?

Her. Desire, Socrates, is stronger far.

Soc. And do you not think that many a one would escape from Hades, if he did not bind those who depart to him by the strongest of chains?

Her. Assuredly they would.

Soc. And if by the greatest of chains, then by some desire, as I should certainly infer, and not by necessity?

Her. That is clear.

Soc. And there are many desires?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And therefore by the greatest desire, if the chain is to be the greatest?

Her. Yes.

Soc. And is any desire stronger than the thought that you will be made better by associating with another?

¹Cf. Republic, iii. 386, 387.

Her. Certainly not.

Soc. And is not that the reason, Hermogenes, why no one, who has been to him, is willing to come back to us? Even the Sirens, like all the rest of the world, have been laid under his spells. Such a charm, as I imagine, is the God able to infuse into his words. And, according to this view, he is the perfect and accomplished Sophist, and the great benefactor of the inhabitants of the other world; and even to us who are upon earth be sends from below exceeding blessings. For he has much more than he wants down there; wherefore he is called Pluto (or the rich). Note also, that he will have nothing to do with men while they are in the body, but only when the soul is liberated from the desires and evils of the body. Now there is a great deal of philosophy and reflection in that; [404] for in their liberated state he can bind them with the desire of virtue, but while they are flustered and maddened by the body, not even father Cronos himself would suffice to keep them with him in his own far famed chains.

Her. There is a deal of truth in what you say.

Soc. Yes, Hermogenes, and the legislator called him Hades, not from the unseen (άειδέϛ) -far otherwise, but from his knowledge (είδέναι) of all noble things.

Her. Very good; and what do we say of Demeter, and Here, and Apollo, and Athene, and Hephaestus, and Ares, and the other deities?

Soc. Demeter is ἠ διδουσα μήτηρ, who gives food like a mother: Here is the lovely one (έρατὴ)-for Zeus, according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a disguise of the air (ἀὴρ), putting the end in the place of the beginning. You will recognize the truth of this if you repeat the letters if Here several times over. People dread the name of Apollo-and with as little reason: the fear, if I am not mistaken, only arises from their ignorance of the nature of names. But they go changing the name into Phersephone, and they are terrified at this; whereas the new name means only that the Goddess is wise (σοϕή); for seeing that all things in the world are in motion (ϕερομένων), that principle which embraces and touches and is able to follow them, is wisdom. And therefore the Goddess may be truly called Pherepapha (Φερεπάϕα), or some name like it, because she touches that which is in motion (τού ϕερομένου έϕπτομένη), herein showing her wisdom. And Hades, who is wise, consorts with her, because she is wise. They alter her name into Pherephatta now-a-days, because the present generation care for euphony more than truth. There is the other name. Apollo, which, as I was saying, is generally supposed to have some terrible signification. Have you remarked this fact?

Her. To be sure I have, and what you say is true.

Soc. But the name, in my opinion, is really most expressive of the power of the God.

He r. How so?

Soc. I will endeavour to explain, for I do not believe that any single name could have been better adapted to express the attributes [405] of the God, embracing and in a manner signifying all four or them,—music, and prophecy, and medicine, and archery.

Her. That must be a strange name, and I should like to hear the explanation.

Soc. Say rather an harmonious name, as beseems the God of Harmony. In the first place, the purgations and purifications which doctors and diviners use, and their fumigations with drugs magical or medicinal, as well as their washings and lustral sprinklings, have all one and the same object, which is to make a man pure both in body and soul.

Her. Very true.

Soc. And is not Apollo the purifier, and the washer, and the absolver from all impurities?

Her. Very true.

Soc. Then in reference to his ablutions and absolutions, as being the physician who orders them, he may be rightly called Απολούων (purifier); or in respect of his powers of divination, and his truth and sincerity, which is the same as truth, he may be most fitly called Απλώϛ, from ἁπλούϛ (sincere), as in the Thessalian dialect, for all the Thessalians call him Απλόϛ; also he is ἀεί Βάλλων (always shooting), because he is a master archer who never misses; or again, the name may refer to his musical attributes, and then, as in ἀκόλουθοϛ, and ἂκοιτιϛ, and in many other words the a is supposed to mean "together," so the meaning of the name Apollo will be "moving together," whether in the poles of heaven as they are called, or in the harmony of song, which is termed concord, because he moves all together by an harmonious power, as astronomers and musicians ingeniously declare. And he is the God who presides over harmony, and makes all things move together, both among Gods and among men. And as in the words ἀκόλουθοϛ and ἂκοιτιϛ the a is substituted for an o, so the name 'Απόλλων is equivalent to ὁμοπολών; only the second A is added in order to avoid the ill-omened sound of destruction (ἀπολών). Now the suspicion of this destructive power still haunts the minds of some who do not consider the true value of the name, [406] which, as I was saying just now, has reference to all the powers of the God, who is the single one, the ever darting. the purifier, the mover together (ἀπλύϛ, ἀεί Βάλλων, ἀπολούων, ὁμοπολών). The name 01 the Muses and of music would seem to be derived from their making philosophical enquiries (μώσθαι); and Leto is called by this name, because she is such a gentle God and so willing (ἐθελήμων) to grant our requests; or her name may be Letho, as she is often called by strangers—they seem to imply by it her amiability, and her smooth and c going way of behaving. Artemis is named from her healthy (ἀρτεμὴϛ), well-ordered nature, and because of her love of virginity, perhaps because she is a proficient in virtue (ἀρετὴ) and perhaps also as hating intercourse of the sexes (τὸν ἂροτον μισήσασα). He who gave the Goddess her name may have had any or all of these reasons.

Her. What is the meaning of Dionysus and Aphrodite?

Soc. Son of Hipponicus, you ask a solemn question; there is a serious and also a facetious explanation of both these names: the serious explanation is not to be had from me. but there is no objection to your hearing the facetious one; for the Gods too love a joke. Διόνυσοϛ is simply διδούϛ οἶνον (giver of wine), Διόνυσοϛ, as he might be called in fun,—and οἶνοϛ is properly οἰόνουϛ, because wine makes those who drink, think (οἲεσθαι) that they have a mind (νούν) when they have none. The derivation of Aphrodite, born of the foam (ἀϕρὸϛ), may be fairly accepted on the author:: Hesiod.

Her. Still there remains Athene, whom you, Socrates, as an Athenian, will surely not forget; there are also Hephaestus and Ares.

Soc. I am not likely to forget them.

Her. Xo, indeed.

Soc. There is no difficulty in explaining the other appellation of Athene.

Her. What other appellation?

Soc. We call her Pallas.

Her. To be sure.

Soc. And we cannot be wrong in supposing that this is derived from armed dances. For the elevation of oneself or anything else above the earth, [407] or by the use of the hands, we call shaking (πάλλεν), or dancing.

Her. hat is quite true.

Soc. Then that is the explanation of the name Pallas?

Soc. Athene?

Her. Yes.

Soc. That is a graver matter, and there, my friend, the modern interpreters of Homer may, I think, assist in explaining the ancients. For most of these in their explanations of the poet, assert that he meant by Athene “mind” (νούϛ) and “intelligence” (διάνοια), and the maker of names appears to have had a singular notion about her and indeed calls her by a still higher title, “divine intelligence” (θεού νόησιϛ), as though he would say: This is she who has the mind of God (θεονόα);-using α as a dialectical variety for η, and taking away ε and σ. Perhaps, however, the name θεονόή may mean “she who knows divine things” (θεία νοούσα) better than others. Nor shall we be far wrong in supposing that the author of it wished to identify this Goddess with moral intelligence (ἐν ἢθονόη νόησιν), and therefore gave her the name ἢθονόη; which, however, either he or his successors have altered into what they thought a nicer form, and called her Athene.

Her, But what do you say of Hephaestus?

Soc. Speak you of the princely lord of light (ϕάεοϛ ἲστορα) :

Her. Surely.

Soc, Ήϕιστοϛ is Φαῖστοϛis, and has added the ?; by attraction; that is obvious to anybody.

Her, That is very probable, until some more probable notion gets into your head.

Soc. To prevent that, you had better ask what is the derivation of Ares.

Her, What is Ares?

Soc. Ares may be called, it you will, from his manhood (ἂρρεν) and manliness, or if you please, from his hard and unchangeable nature, which is the meaning of ἂρρατοϛ: the latter is a derivation in every way appropriate to the God of war.

Her, Very true.

Soc. And now, by the Gods, let us have no more of the Gods, for I am afraid of them: ask about anything but them, and thou shalt see how the steeds of Euthyphro can prance.

Her. Only one more God! I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out. and then I shall knew whether there is any meaning in what Cratylus says.

Soc. I should imagine that the name Hermes has to do with speech. [408] and signifies that he is the interpreter (ίρμηνεύϛ), or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer; all that sort of thing has a great deal to do with language; as I was telling you the word είριν is expressive of the use of speech, and there is an often recurring Homeric word ίμἠσατο, which means “he contrived”-out of these two words, ἀ ρειν and μήσασθαι, the legislator formed the name of the God who invented language and speech; and we may imagine him dictating to us the use of this name: “O my friends,” says he to us, “seeing that he is the contriver of tales or speeches, you may rightly call him Είρἐμηϛ.” And this has been improved by us, as we think, into Hermes. Iris also appears to have been called from the verb “to tell” (εἰρειν), because she was a messenger.

Her. Then I am very sure that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes (Έρμογένηϛ), for I am not a good hand at speeches.

Soc. There is also reason, my friend, in Pan being the double-formed son of Hermes.

Her. How do you make that out?

Soc. You are aware that speech signifies all things (πάν), and is always turning them round, and has two forms, true and false?

Her. Certainly.

Soc. Is not the truth that is in him the smooth or sacred form which dwells above among the Gods, whereas falsehood dwells among men below, and is rough like the goat of tragedy: for tales and falsehoods have generally to do with the tragic or goatish life and tragedy is the place of them?

Her. Very true.

Soc. Then surely Pan, who is the declarer of all thing (πάν) and the perpetual mover (ἀεί πολών) of all things, is rightly called αίπόλοϛ (goat-herd), he being the two-formed son of Hermes, smooth in his upper part, and rough and goatlike in his lower regions. And, as the son of Hermes, he is speech or the brother of speech, and that brother should be like brother is no marvel. But, as I was saying, my dear Hermogenes, let us get away from the Gods.

Her. From these sort of Gods, by all means, Socrates. But why should we not discuss another kind of Gods-the sun, moon, stars, earth, aether, air, fire, water, the seasons, and the year?

Soc. You impose a great many tasks upon me. Still, if you wish, I will not refuse.

# **18 AUGUSTINE: *Christian Doctrine,* BK I, CH 6 626a-b**

Chap. 6. *In what sense God is ineffable*

6. Have I spoken of God, or uttered His praise, in any worthy way? Nay, I feel that I have done nothing more than desire to speak; and if I have said anything, it is not what I desired to say. How do I know this, except from the fact that God is unspeakable? But what I have said, if it had been unspeakable, could not have been spoken. And so God is not even to be called "unspeakable," because to say even this is to speak of Him. Thus there arises a curious contradiction of words, because if the unspeakable is what cannot be spoken of, it is not unspeakable if it can be called unspeakable. And this opposition of words is rather to be avoided by silence than to be explained away by speech. And yet God, although nothing worthy of His greatness can be said of Him, has condescended to accept the worship of men's mouths, and has desired us through the medium of our own words to rejoice in His praise. For on this principle it is that He is called Deus (God). For the sound of those two syllables in itself conveys no true knowledge of His nature; but yet all who know the Latin tongue are led, when that sound reaches their ears, to think of a nature supreme in excellence and eternal in existence.

# **19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 1-2 15c-16a; A 3, REP I 16a-d; A 6, REP I 18c-19a; Q 4, A I, REP I 20d-21b; A 3, ANS 22b-23b; Q 5, A 2, REP I 24b-25a; Q 13 62b-75b; Q 14, A I, REP 1-2 75d-76c; PART I-II, Q 14, A I, REP 2 677b-678a; Q 47, A I, REP I 819c-820b**

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 3, A 2, REP 1-2 15c-16a

Article 2. *Whether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It seems that God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 1. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form, since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God, for it is mentioned in Hebrews (10. 38), where God says: But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul. Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 2. Further, anger, joy, and the like are passions of the composite as is said in the book on the Soul.² But these are attributed to God in Scripture : The Lord was exceeding angry with His people (Ps. 105. 40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Obj. 3. Further, matter is the principle of individuation. But God seems to be individual, for He is not predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is what first inheres in matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article. Therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is that which is in potency. But we have shown (q. ii, a. 3) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form is perfect and good through its form. Therefore its goodness is participated, according as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best—namely God—is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form.

Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form. Hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause as we have shown (q. ii, a. 3). He is therefore of His essence a form, and not composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1. A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for,

²Aristotle, 1, 1 (403ᵃ3).

that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

Reply Obj. 2. Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a likeness of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

Reply Obj. 3. Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another since it is the first underlying subject; but form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in another; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, A 3, REP I 16a-d

Article 3. *Whether God Is the Same As His Essence or Nature?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article*: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

Objection 1. For nothing is in itself. But the essence or nature of God, which is the Godhead, is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that

God is not the same as His essence or nature.

Obj. 2. Further, the effect is likened to its cause, for every agent produces its like. But in created things the suppositum is not identical with its nature, for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life, and not only that He is living: I am the way, the truth, and the life (John 14. 6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.

I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the suppositum, because the essence or nature comprises in itself only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity comprises in itself all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all its individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. One of the elements in this defect in imitation is that what is one and simple can be represented only by many things. And so there comes about in these effects composition, which renders suppositum distinct from nature in them. For this flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidents designating this matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is a man. Hence the thing which is a man has something in it which humanity does not have. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly the same, but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles by which a thing is defined are as the formal constituent in relation to the individualizing matter.

On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to this matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves,—it is necessary that the forms themselves should be subsisting supposita. Therefore suppositum and nature do not differ in them as we have shown above (a. 2.). Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

Reply Obj. 1. We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore, in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, it must be ascribed to the diversity which lies in the way our intellect receives, and not to any diversity in reality.

Reply Obj. 2. The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, A 6, REP I 18c-19a

Article 6. *Whether in God There Are Any Accidents?*

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article*: It seems that there are accidents in God.

Objection 1. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says.² Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributed to God. Therefore in God there are accidents.

Obj. 2. Further, in every genus there is one first. But there are many genera of accidents. If, therefore, the first members of these genera are not in God, there will be many first beings other than God—which is unfitting.

On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius says (De Trinit.).³ Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potency to act ; for a subject is in some way in act by its accidents. But there can be no potency in God, as was shown (q. ii, a. 3). Secondly, because God is His existence; and as Boethius says (De Hebdom.),⁴ although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being; thus what is hot can have something outside of heat added to it, as whiteness, although heat itself can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Hence as God is absolute primal being, there can be nothing accidental in Him. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

Reply Obj. 1. Virtue and wisdom are not said of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.

Reply Obj. 2. Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior. God, however, is not first as if contained in the genus of substance, but He is

²Physics, 1, 3 (186ᵇ4). ³Chap. 2 (PL 64, 1250). ⁴PL 64, 13 1 1.

first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 4, A I, REP I 20d-21b

QUESTION IV

THE PERFECTION OF GOD

(*In Three Articles*)

Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection ; secondly of the divine goodness (q. v).

Concerning the first there are three points of

inquiry: — (1) Whether God is perfect? (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things? (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?

Article 1. *Whether God Is Perfect?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It seems that to be perfect does not belong to God.

Objection 1. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.

Obj. 2. Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.

Obj. 3. Further, as shown above (q. iii, A. 4), God's essence is being itself. But being itself seems most imperfect, since it is most general and receptive of all addition. Therefore God is imperfect.

On the contrary, It is written : Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect (Matt. 5. 48).

I answer that, is the Philosopher relates¹ some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans, and Leucippus. did not attribute "best" and "most perfect"' to the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle, and a first material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is in potency, the first material principle must be potential in the highest degree, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is in potency, an agent, as such, is in act. Hence, the first active principle must be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is said to be perfect according as it is in act. Because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1. As Gregory says (Moral. v, 36):² "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God."' For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect when from potency they are brought into act. this word "'perfect'" signifies whatever is not wanting in act, whether this be by way of perfection or not.

Reply Obj. 2. The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely first, but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it is the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it the animal or plant from which it came. Because, previous to that which is in potency must be that which is in act; since a being in potency can only be reduced to act by some being in act.

Reply Obj. 3. Being itself is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as act ; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence being itself is the actuality of all things, even of forms themselves. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received, but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the being of man, or horse, or anything else, being itself is considered as formal, and as something received, and not as that to which being belongs.

¹Metaphysics, xii, 7 (1072ᵇ30).

²PL 75, 715.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, A 3, ANS 22b-23b

Article 3. *Whether Any Creature Can Be Like God?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article*: It seems that no creature can be like God.

Objection 1. For it is written (Ps. 85. 8): There is none among the gods like unto Thee, Lord. But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like to God.

Obj. 2. Further, likeness is a kind of comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as God, since God is in no genus, as shown above (q. iii, a. 5). Therefore no creature is like God.

Obj. 3. Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and being itself differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.

Obj. 4. Further, among like things there is mutual likeness ; for like is similar to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: To whom have you likened God? (40. 18).

On the contrary, It is written: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. 1. 2 6), and: When He shall appear we shall be like to Him (I John 3. 2).

I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like which communicate in the same form according to the same notion, and according to the same measure, and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness. And this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same notion, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white. And this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same aspect, as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same aspect of the species ; as man reproduces man. If however the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the aspect of the same species ; as things generated by the sun's power may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any genus, its effects will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same specific or generic aspect, but only according to some sort of analogy ; as being is common to all. In this way the things that are from God, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.

Reply Obj. 1. As Dionysius says (Div. Norn. ix),¹ when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, "it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and lessening, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white, but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.

Reply Obj. 2. God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different genus, but as that which is outside genus, and as the principle of all genera.

Reply Obj. 3. Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the aspect of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, according as namely, God is being by essence, while other things are beings by participation.

Reply Obj. 4. Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must in no way be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says {Div. Nom. ix):² "A mutual likeness maybe found between things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God, but not that God is like a creature.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 5, A 2, REP I 24b-25a

Article 2. *Whether Good Is Prior in Idea to Being?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It seems that good is prior in idea to being.

Objection 1. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii)¹ assigned the first place, amongst other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea good is prior to being.

Ob). 2. Further, that which extends to more things is prior according to reason. But good extends to more things than being, because, as Dionysius notes (loc. cit. v),² "the good extends to things both existing and non-existing; but existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore good is prior in idea to being.

Ob). 3. Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But good seems to be more universal than being, since the good has the aspect of desirable, while for some non-being is desirable; for it is said of Judas: It were better for him, if that man had not been born (Matt. 26. 24). Therefore good is prior in idea to being.

Ob). 4. Further, not only is being desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things be-

¹Sect. 1 (PG 3, 680).

²PG 3 , 816.

sides. Thus it seems that being is a particular desirable thing, and goodness a universal one. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.

On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle³ that "the first of created things is being."

I answer that, being is prior in idea to good. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the intellect conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being, because everything is knowable only in so far as it is in act as it says in the Metaphysics.⁴ Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is that which is primarily intelligible, as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore being is prior in idea to good.

Reply Ob). 1. Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii)⁵ as implying some causal relation in God ; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But the good, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the relation of a final cause, the causality of which is first, since an agent does not act except for some end, and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus good, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, good precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing matter from privation, said that matter was nonbeing,⁶ the good is more extensively participated than being; for prime matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is held to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (loc. cit. Obj. 2).

Reply Ob). 2. The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them—provided that by non-existence we understand not absolutely those things which do not exist at ail, but those which are potential, and not actual. For good has the nature of end, in which not only actual things rest, but also towards which even those things which are not in act, but merely in potency tend.

³Lib. de Causis, 4 (BA 166.19).

⁴Aristotle, ix, 9 (1051ᵃ31).

⁵Sect. 7 (PG 3, 596).

⁶Aristotle, Physics, 1, 9 (192ᵃ2); see Albert the Great, Physics, 1, 3, 16 (BO iii, 856).

Now being implies the relation of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.

Reply Ob). 3. Non-being is desirable not of itself, but only accidentally—that is, in so far as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself, and nonbeing only accidentally, in so far as one seeks some being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.

Reply Obj. 4. Life, knowledge, and the like, are desired only so far as they are actual. Hence in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being, and consequently nothing is good except being.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 13 62b-75b

QUESTION XIII

THE NAMES OF GOD

*(In Twelve Articles)*

After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry. (1) Whether God can be named by us? (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially? (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically? (4) Whether many names applied to God are synonymous? (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally? (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures? (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time? (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation? (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name? (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God by nature, by participation, and by opinion? (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God? (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

Article 1. *Whether Any Name Is Suitable to God?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It seems that no name is suitable to God.

Objection 1. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i)¹ that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him"; and it is written: What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest? (Prov. 30. 4).

Obj. 2. Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, since they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

Obj. 3. Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, since relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.

On the contrary, It is written (Exod. 15. 3): The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name.

I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher,² words are signs of ideas, and ideas the likeness of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as it can be known by our intellect. Now it was shown above (q. xii, aa.

¹Sect, 5 (PG 3, 593).

²Interpretation, 1 (16ᵃ3).

ii, 12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures,, yet not so that the name which signifies Kim expresses the divine essence in itself, as for instance the name '"man" expresses by its meaning the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by declaring his essence. For the notion expressed by the name is the definition.

Reply Obj. 1. The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God and signify in word.

Reply Obj. 2. Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us as we have said before (q. xii. a. 4). And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is composite, whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is, hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning according as they belong to composite things. But names given to signify simple forms signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that by which a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that by which a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His subsistence and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, since our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

Reply Obj. 3. To signify substance with quality is to signify the suppositum with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For just as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of composite things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to composite and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as pointing out what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.

Article 2. *Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially?*

*We proceed thus to the Second Article*: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially.

Objection 1. For Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 9):¹ ''Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation."

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nam. i)²: "You will find a chorus of all the holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denominations of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything does not signify anything pertaining to its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi)³: "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

I answer that, Negative names applied to God or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at ail signify His substance. but rather express the distance of the creature from Him. or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself. But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God. such as good, wise, and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God rather than to place anything in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing, and the same in like manner applies to other names;

¹PG 94.833.

²Sect. 4 (PG 3. 589).

³Chap. 4 (PL 42. 927).

and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.¹ Others² say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures; thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things ; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might in like manner be said that God is a body, since He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body, takes away the notion that He is being in potency only as is prime matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, because it signifies only the cause of health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say that He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine —namely, that these names signify the divine substance and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it was shown above (q. iv, a. 2) that God possesses beforehand in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself absolutely and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness to it, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (q. iv, A. 3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore these names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly.

¹Guide, i, 58 (FR 82).

²Alan of Lille, Theol. Reg., Reg. 21, 26 (PL 210, 631, 633).

So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil," but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God," and in a higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good because He causes goodness, but rather, on the contrary, He pours out goodness in things because He is good, according to what Augustine says,³ "Because He is good, we are."

Reply Obj. 1. Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, since by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is, but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply Obj. 2. In the signification of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance this name "stone" (lapis) is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot (Iadit pedem) ; but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner, so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession. But nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the processions themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the senses were, "life proceeds from Him," but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply Obj. 3. We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him according as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

Article 3. *Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Properly?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article*: It seems that no name is applied properly to God.

Objection 1. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures, as was explained above (a. i). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore

³Christian Doctrine, 1, 32 (PL 34, 32).

names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

Obj. 2. Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as good. wise, and the like, are more truly withheld from God than given to Him. as appears from what Dionysius says (Cal. Hier. ii).¹ Therefore none of these names belong to God in their proper sense.

Obj. 3. Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only, since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition, for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide, ii).² ''Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God figuratively by way of similitude."' Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their proper sense.

I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God. There are two things to be considered—namely, the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life, and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God. and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God. for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

Reply Obj. 1. There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself, as stone signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification, as the words being, good.

¹Sect.: PG 3. 141). ²Prologue (PL 16, 583).

living, and the like, and such names can be properly applied to God.

Reply Obj. 2. Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary- sense of its signification. but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is '"above all substance and all life.''

Reply Obj. 3. These names which are applied to God properly imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; but those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

Article 4. *Whether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous?*

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article*: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names.

Objection 1. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God: for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Obj. 2. Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is an empty idea. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one. it seems also that these ideas are ideas to no purpose.

Obj. 3. Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea, and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas: and thus they are synonymous.

On the contrary. All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say. "venture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God." or the like, and yet it is written. most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name (Jer. 32. 18).

I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand if we said that these names are used to remove or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that 'here are different ideas as regards the diverse thing denied of God. or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above (a. 2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (aa. 1, 2) that they have diverse meanings. For the notion signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, while in creatures they are received divided and multiplied. As, therefore, to the different perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions. Therefore, although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that thing under many and different aspects they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing, because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply Obj. 2. The many aspects of these names are not empty and worthless, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply Obj. 3. The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet many in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, just as things represent Him in a manifold way.

Article. 5. *Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated of Them?*

*We proceed thus to the Fifth Article*: It seems that what is said of God and creatures is said of them univocally.

Objection 1. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one ; for if the name dog be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—namely, of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinity. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced is an univocal agent; and thus what is said of God and creatures is predicated univocally.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no likeness among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (1. 26), Let us make man to our image and likeness, it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.

Obj. 3. Further, "measure is homogeneous" with the thing measured as is said in the Metaphysics.¹ But God is the first measure of all beings, as it says in the same place. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures, and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.

On the contrary, Whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same meaning is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same meaning that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes a nature, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

2. Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures. And so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause receives the likeness of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by the exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections of things which exist in creatures divided and multiplied pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus, when

¹Aristotle, x, 1 (1053ᵃ24).

any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by this term wise applied to a man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and being, and from all similar things ; but when we apply it to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or being. Thus also this term wise applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified ; but this is not the case when it is applied to God, but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same aspect to God and to man. The same applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said.¹ Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all, for the reasoning would always fall into the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is as much against philosophy which proves many things about God as it is against what the Apostle says: The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i. 20).

Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures according to analogy, that is, according to proportion. Now names are thus used in two ways : either according as many things are proportionate to one, as for example healthy is predicated of medicine and urine in so far as each has an order and proportion to the health of the animal, of which the latter is the sign and the former the cause, or according as one thing is proportionate to another; thus healthy is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (a. 1). Thus, whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently.

Now this mode of community is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in those things which are spoken of

¹Maimonides, Guide, i, 59 (FR 84); Averroes, In Meta., xii, comm. 51 (viii, 337B).

analogically neither is there one notion, as there is in univocal things, nor totally diverse notions as in equivocal things ; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies different proportions to some one thing; thus healthy applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

Reply Obj. 1. Although in predication the equivocal must be reduced to the univocal. Still in actions the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men. But the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent, and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent while it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness ; but it can be called an analogical agent, just as in predications all univocal terms are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical term, which is being.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (q. iv, a. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary, prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures, yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

Article 6. *Whether Names Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures Rather Than of God?*

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article*: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Objection 1. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since names, as the Philosopher says,² are signs of ideas. But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i)³ that we name God from creatures. But

²Interpretation, 1 (16ᵃ3). ³Sect. 6 (PG 3, 596).

names transferred from creatures to God are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as lion, stone, and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

Obj. 3. Further, all names applied in common to God and creatures, "are applied to God as the cause of all things," as Dionysius says (De Myst. Theol.).¹ But what is said of anything through its cause is applied to it secondarily; for "healthy" is primarily said of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

On the contrary, It is written, I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is yiamed (Eph. 3. 14, 15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

I answer that, In all names which are said of many in an analogical sense, they must all be said with reference to one thing, and therefore this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since "the nature expressed by the name is the definition," as the Philosopher says,² such a name must be said primarily of that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according to the order in which they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, healthy applied to animals comes into the definition of healthy applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal, and also into the definition of healthy which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus, all names which are said metaphorically of God, are said of creatures primarily rather than of God, because when said of God they mean only likenesses to such creatures. For as smiling said of a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like to the beauty of the human smile according to the likeness of proportion, so the name of lion said of God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that as they are said of God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.

But to other names not said of God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as

¹I, 2 (PG 3, 1000).

²Metaphysics, iv, 7 (1012ᵃ23).

some have supposed.³ For when it is said. "God is good," it would then only mean, "God is the cause of the creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would include in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence good would apply primarily to creatures rather than God. But as was shown above (a. 2), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these preexist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards the thing which the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures, which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above (a. 3).

Reply Obj. 1. This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply Obj. 2. The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection would be valid if these names were said of God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as healthy is applied to medicine.

Article 7. *Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of God Temporally?*

*We proceed thus to the Seventh Article*: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally.

Objection 1. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De Fide, i)⁴ that "this name 'Lord' is a name of power." which is the divine substance; and Creation signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

Obj. 2. Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made ; for what is white temporally is made white. But to be made does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

Obj. 3. Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some

³Alan of Lille, Theol. Reg., Reg. 21, 26 (PL 210, 631, 633). ⁴PL 16, 553.

names implying relation to creatures are spoken of God from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: / have loved thee with an everlasting love (Jer. 31. 3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, such as Lord and Creator, are applied to God from eternity.

Obj. 4. Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not said of God temporally.

Obj. 5. Further, a thing is called relative from relation ; for instance lord from lordship, and as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Obj. 6. Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as "a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it," as the Philosopher says.¹ But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names, "Lord" and "Creator," are said of God from eternity, and not temporally.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 18),² that this relative appellation "Lord" belongs to God temporally.

I answer that, Certain names which import relation to creatures are said of God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said³ that relation is not a thing of nature, but of reason only. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a natural order and relation to one another. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation requires two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is a thing of reason only, as when mutual order or relation can be between things only in the apprehension of reason; as when we say the same thing is

¹Categories, 7 (7ᵇ30). ²Chap. 16 (PL 42, 922).

³Unnamed in Averroes, In Mela., xii, comm. 19 (viii, 306B). Cf. also St. Thomas, De Pot., Q. viii, A. 2.

the same as itself. For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain relation of the same thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between being and non-being which reason forms in so far as it apprehends, non-being as an extreme. The same is true of all relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like. Now there are other relations which are things of nature as regards both extremes, as when for instance a relation exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both, as is clear of all relations consequent upon quantity, such as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes. And the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as moving power and the moveable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a thing of nature, while in the other extreme it is a thing of reason only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as for example sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to knowable things which, in so far as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intelligible existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, according as they are ordered to the knowing or to the sensing of things; but the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but according to reason only in so far as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence, the Philosopher says⁴ that they are called relative, not because they are related to other things, but because "others are related to them." Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a column unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side, which relation is not really in the column but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; in God however there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation according to reason only, in so far as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an

⁴Metaphysics, v, 15 (1021ᵃ29).

animal without change in itself, but by the shifting of the animal.

Reply Obj. 1. Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative relations themselves, as master and servant, father and son, and the like, and these are called relative according to being {secundum esse). But others are imposed to signify the things from which follow certain relations such as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like; and these are called relative according to appellation {secundum diet). Thus, there must be considered the same twofold difference in divine names. For some signify the relation itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding relations, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporally as to the relation they imply, either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply Obj. 2. As relations applied to God temporally are not in God except according to reason, so, to become, or to be made are not said of God except according to reason, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, Lord, Thou art become [Douay, hast been] our refuge (Ps. 89. 1).

Reply Obj. 3. The operation of the intellect and will is in the operator, and therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will are applied to God from eternity; but those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like.

Reply Obj. 4. Relations signified by these names which are said of God temporally are in God according to reason only, but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time, in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, in so far as the creature is referred to Him; thus the Philosopher says¹ that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge refers to it.

¹Metaphysics, v, 15 (1021ᵃ30).

Reply Obj. 5. Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him, and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not according to reason only, but in reality ; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply Obj. 6. To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary to consider the order of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature; as for instance double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. And this is the way science and the knowable thing are related; for the knowable thing is spoken of according to potency, and the science according to habit, or act. Hence the knowable thing in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same thing is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the thing known is nothing unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.

Article 8. *Whether This Name God Is a Name of the Nature?*

*We proceed thus to the Eighth Article*: It seems that this name, God, is not a name of the nature.

Objection 1. For Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i)² that "God (Θεὀϛ) is so called from θεεῖν which means to take care of, and to cherish all things; or from αἲθειν, that is, to burn, for our God is a consuming fire; or from θεᾰσ-θαι, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name God signifies His operation and not His nature.

Obj. 2. Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name God does not signify the divine nature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide, i)³ that God is a name of a nature.

I answer that, That by which a name is imposed and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know the subs

²Chap. 9 (PG 94, 835). ³Chap. 1 (PL 16, 553).

stance of a thing from its properties and operations, so we name the substance of a thing sometimes from its operation, or its property; for example, we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot (Iadit pedem) ; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness, and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same. Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we can name Him from these, as said in a. i. Hence this name God is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things, since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Norn, xii),¹ "The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name God is imposed to signify the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 1. All that Damascene says refers to providence, which is the source of the signification of the name God.

Reply Obj. 2. We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what the substance of stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of stone as it is in itself ; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for "the nature which the name signifies is the definition," as is said in the Metaphysics.² Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature as it is in itself, so as to know what it is, but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality and of negation as stated above (q. xii, A. 12). Thus the name God signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things, and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.

Article 9. *Whether This Name God Is Communicable?*

*We proceed thus to the Ninth Article*: It seems that this name God is communicable.

Objection 1. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name God as we have said above

¹Sect. 2 (PG 3, 969). ²Aristotle, iv, 7 (1012ᵃ23).

(a. 8) signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, He hath given us great [Vulg., most great] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg., ye] may be made partakers of the divine nature (II Pet. 1. 4). Therefore this name God can be communicated to others.

Obj. 2. Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name God is not a proper, but an appellative noun, which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, I have said, You are gods (Ps. 81. 6). Therefore this name God is communicable.

Obj. 3. Further, this name God comes from operation, as explained (a. 8). But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable, such as good, wise, and the like. Therefore this name God is communicable.

On the contrary, It is written : They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones (Wisd. 14. 21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name God is incommunicable.

I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways, properly, and by likeness. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by likeness it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name "lion" is properly communicated to all things of the same nature as lion; by likeness it is communicable to those who participate in something lion-like, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically.

To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular suppositum, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or at least according to reason; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea ; but the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many supposita, and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular suppositum or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of the nature of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea, for the plurality of this individual thing cannot fall within the apprehension. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of likeness ; as for instance a person can be called Achilles metaphorically, because he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength.

On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any suppositum, but by themselves, because they are subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves could not be communicated either in reality or in idea, but only perhaps by way of likeness, as was said of individuals. But because we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, but understand them after the mode of composite things having forms in matter, therefore, as was said in the first article (Ans. 2), we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some suppositum. Hence, so far as concerns names, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of composite things as to names given by us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name God is given to signify the divine nature as stated above (a. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (q. xi, a. 3), it follows that this name God is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion, just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: You served them who by nature are not gods (Gal. 4. 8), and a gloss adds,¹ Gods not in nature, "but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name God is communicable not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of likeness, so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, I have said, You are gods (Ps. 81. 6).

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His suppositum, according as He is considered as "this something," that name would be in every way incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the name Tetragrammaton among the Hebrews ; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply Obj. 1. The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some likeness.

Reply Obj. 2. This name God is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor, all

¹Glossa Lombardi (PL 192, 139); cf. Glossa interl., (vi, 84V).

though God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being which is in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our knowledge. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name sun.

Reply Obj. 3. These names good, wise, and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures ; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely, and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name God is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.

Article 10. *Whether This Name God Is Applied to God Univocally, by Nature, by Participation, and According to Opinion?*

*We proceed thus to the Tenth Article*: It seems that this name God is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion.

Objection 1. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says : "An idol is God." Therefore God in both senses is spoken of univocally.

Obj. 2. Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name happiness is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name God is applied univocally to the true God and to God also in opinion.

Obj. 3. Further, names are called univocal because they contain one notion. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands by the name of God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all, while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An idol is God." Therefore this name God is applied univocally to both.

On the contrary, That which is in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Interpretation.² But the word animal applied to a true animal and to a picture of one is equivocal. Therefore this name God applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.

Further, No one can signify what he does not

²Aristotle, 1 (16ᵃ5).

know. But the gentile does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says there is one God. Therefore this name God is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.

I answer that, This name God in the three above significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent for this reason. Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different things; but in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, being which is applied to substance is placed in the definition of being as applied to accident; and healthy applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.

The same applies to the question at issue. For this name God, as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god something having likeness to the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand that we are signifying something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.

Reply Obj. 1. The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the meaning; for this name man, of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name man we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name man what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God, because each of them uses this name God to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in that sense, as in the Psalm, All the gods of the Gentiles are demons (Ps. 95- 5). The same remark applies to the second and third Objections. For those reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.

Reply Obj. 4. The term animal applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal for the Philosopher¹ takes equivocal names in a wide sense, including analogous names ; because being also, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.

Reply Obj. 5. Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself, but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion (q. xii, a. 12). So the Gentile can take this name God in the same way when he says an idol is God as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.

Article 2. *Whether This Name, He Who Is, Is the Most Proper Name of God?*

*We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article*: It seems that this name he who is is not the most proper name of God.

Objection 1. For this name God is an incommunicable name, as we have said (a. 9). But this name he who is, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name he who is is not the most proper name of God.

Obj. 2. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii)² that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name good is supremely proper to God, and not this name he who is.

Obj. 3. Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name he who is imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name he who is is not the most applicable to God.

On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, if they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them? The Lord answered him, Thus shalt thou say to them, he who is hath sent me to you (Exod. 3. 13, 14). Therefore this name, he who is, most properly belongs to God.

I answer that, This name, he who is, is most properly applied to God, for three reasons. First, because of its signification. For it does

¹Categories, 1 (1ᵃ1). ²Sect. 1 (PG 3, 680).

not signify form, but being itself. Hence since the being of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (q. iii, a. 4), it is clear that among other names this one specially names God, for everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea, hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly are they applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i)¹ that, "he who is, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains being itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name he who is determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all ; and therefore it denominates the "infinite sea of substance."

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies being in the present, and this above all properly applies to God, "whose being knows not past or future," as Augustine says (De Trin. v).²

Reply Obj. 1. This name he who is is the name of God more properly than this name God both as regards its source, namely, being, and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the meaning intended by the name, this name God is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.

Reply Obj. 2. This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely ; for being, considered absolutely, comes before the idea of cause.

Reply Obj. 3. It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is being itself, from which comes this name, he who is.

¹Chap. 9 (PG 94, 836).

²Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., 1, d. 8, chap. 1 (QR 1, 58); cf. Isidore, Etym., vii, 1 (PL 82, 261).

Article 12. *Whether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed about God?*

*We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article*: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God.

Objection 1. For Dionysius says (Cod Bier. ii)³ that "negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague."

Obj. 2. Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii),⁴ that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (q. iii, a. 7); therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

Obj. 3. Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has being without any composition as shown above (q. iii, a. 7). Therefore since every affirming intellect understands something as composite, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith, as that God is Three and One, and that He is omnipotent. Therefore affirmative propositions can be formed truly about God.

I answer that, Affirmative propositions can be formed truly about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things according to reason. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have a substantial predicate. For it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea ; for the notion of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal," since the same thing which is man is truly animal ; for in the same suppositum there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to suppositum, but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, since the intellect draws to the suppositum what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the suppositum, according to the

³Sect. 3 (PG 3, 140). ⁴PL 64, 1250.

saving that predicates are taken formally, and subjects materially. To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.

God. however, considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that all its conceptions correspond to one and the same thing absolutely. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

Reply Obj. 1. Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or. according to another translation, "incongruous.” in so far as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 2. Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they are in themselves: but it apprehends them according after the manner of composite things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form under the aspect of a subject, and attributes something to it.

Reply Obi. 3. This proposition. '"The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, according as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is. is false. But this does not hold in the present case, because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God. does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in being. For it is clear that our intellect understands material things existing below itself in an immaterial manner: not that it understands them to be immaterial things, but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things which are above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner, yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming a composed proposition about God.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I, Q 14, A I, REP 1-2 75d-76c

Article 1. *Whether There Is Knowledge in God?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It seems that there is not knowledge (scientia) in God.

Objection 1. For knowledge is a habit, and habit does not belong to God. since it is the mean between potency and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

Obj. 2. Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else; namely, by the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God. Therefore science is not in God.

Obj. 3. Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal nor particular (q. xiii, a. 9, Ans. 2). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God (Rom. 11. 33).

I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing beings in that the latter possess only their own form, while the knowing being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the species of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-knowing thing is more contracted and limited, while the nature of knowing things has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says¹ that "the soul is in a certain way all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (q. vii, a. 1, 2) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive, and the mode of knowledge is according to the mode of immateriality. Hence, it is said in the Soul² that plants do not know because of their materiality. But sense is cognitive because it can receive species without matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more "separated from matter and unmixed," as said in the Soul.³ Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality, as stated above (q. vii, a. i), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1. Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (q. iv, a. 2). whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, there must be separated from its signification anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality in God, nor a habit, but substance and pure act.

Reply Obj. 2. Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (q. xiii, a. 4). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different things known. He has understanding as re-

¹Soul, in, 8 (431ᵇ21). ²II, 12 (424ᵃ32).

³Aristotle. Iii, 4 (429ᵃ18;ᵇ5).

gards the knowledge of principles; he has science as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has wisdom, according as he knows the highest cause; he has counsel or prudence, according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (a. 7). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names, in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into the divine predication, everything that savours of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding (Job 12. 13).

Reply Obj. 3. Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows, for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or in potency, or existing according to any such mode.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I-II, Q 14, A I, REP 2 677b-678a

QUESTION XIV

OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE

*(In Six Articles)*

We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry: (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry? (2) Whether counsel is of the end or only of the means? (3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do? (4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do? (5) Whether the process of counsel is one of resolution? (6) Whether the process of counsel is infinite?

Article 1. *Whether Counsel Is an Inquiry?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It seems that counsel is not an inquiry.

Objection 1. For Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. ii)¹ that "counsel is an appetite." But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

Obj. 2. Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect, for which reason it is unbecoming to God, Whose knowledge is not discursive, as we have shown in the First Part (q. xiv, a. 7). But counsel is ascribed to God, for it is written (Eph. 1. ii) that He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will. Therefore counsel is not inquiry.

Obj. 3. Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (I Cor. 7. 25) : Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel. Therefore, counsel is not an inquiry.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa says²: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel."

I answer that, Choice, as stated above (q. xiii, a. 1. Reply 2; a. 3), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done, because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their changeability, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment without previous inquiry. Therefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice, and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says³ that choice is "the desire of what has been already counselled."

Reply Obj. 1. When the acts of two powers are ordered to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power. Consequently each act can be named from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction, are ordered to one another. Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, namely, order, in that act of the will, which is choice. And in counsel, which is an act of reason, there is to be found something of the will,—both as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do),—and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher says⁴ that "choice is intellect influenced by ap-

¹Chap. 22 (PG 94, 945).

²Nemesius, De Nat. Horn., xxxiv (PG 40, 736).

³Ethics, in, 2, 3 (1112ᵃ15, 1113ᵃ11).

⁴Ibid., vi, 2 (1139ᵇ4).

petite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing, so Damascene says (loc. cit.) that "counsel is appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulse the inquiry is made, and to the reason that makes the inquiry.

Reply Obj. 2. The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us. Thus in us science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects, but science when said of God, means certain knowledge of all effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His decision or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God, and therefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God. In which sense Damascene says (loc. cit.) : "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."

Reply Obj. 3. It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica,* PART I-II, Q 47, A I, REP I 819c-820b

QUESTION XLYII

OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER. AND THE REMEDIES OF ANGER

*(In Four Articles*)

We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry? (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger? (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person. (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.

Article 1. *Whether the Motive of Anger Is Always Something Done Against the One Who Is Angry?*

*We proceed thus to the First Article*: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry.

Objection 1. Because man. by sinning, can do nothing against God. for it is written (Job 35. 6) : If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin. According to Ps. 105. 40; The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people. Therefore it is not always on account of something done against him that a man is angry.

Obj. 2. Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always angry on account of something done against us.

Obj. 3. Further, as the Philosopher says.⁴ man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest in : thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy,” and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.

Obj. 4. Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him. provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Horn.

⁴Rhetoric, ii, 2 (1379ᵃ33).

xxii in Ep. ad Rom.).¹ But by holding his tongue he does nothing against the other. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says² that "anger is always due to something done to oneself; but hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such."

I answer that, As stated above (q. xlvi, a. 6), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance. Nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance. For just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him.

Reply Obj. 1. We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of a judgment of justice, according as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm. But so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another, which injury pertains to God, since the person injured is an object of God's providence and protection.

Reply Obj. 2. If we are angry with those who harm others and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us, either by some kinship or by friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.

Reply Obj. 3. When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good, so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.

Reply Obj. 4. Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted; and a slight is an action.

¹PG 60, 609. ²Rhetoric, 11, 4 (1382a2).

# **21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a; XXVI [124-138] 147a-b; XXX [34-99] 152a-d**

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a

28. "Of the Seraphim he who is most in God, Moses, Samuel, and whichever John thou wilt take, I say even Mary, have not their seats in another heaven than those spirits who just now appeared to thee, nor have they more or fewer years for their existence; but all make the first circle beautiful, yet have sweet life diversely, through feeling more or less the eternal breath. These showed themselves here, not because this sphere is allotted to them, but to afford sign of the celestial grade which is least exalted. It is needful to speak thus to your wit, since only through objects of sense does it apprehend that which it afterward makes worthy of the intellect. For this the Scripture condescends to your capacity, and attributes feet and hands to God, and means otherwise; and Holy Church represents to you Gabriel and Michael with human aspect, and the other who made Tobias whole again.²

²See Tobit, 3. 25; 6. 16.

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, XXVI [124-138] 147a-b

115. "Now, my son, the tasting of the tree was not by itself the cause of so great an exile, but only the overpassing of the bound. In that place whence thy Lady moved Virgil, I longed for this assembly during four thousand three hundred and- two revolutions of the sun: and while I was on earth I saw him return to all the lights of his path nine hundred and thirty times. The tongue which I spoke was all extinct long before the people of Nimrod attempted their unaccomplishable work; for never was any product of the reason durable for ever, because of human liking, which alters, following the heavens. That man speaks is work of nature; but, thus or thus, nature then leaves to you to do according as it pleases you. Before I descended to the infernal anguish, the Supreme Good, whence comes the gladness that swathes me was on earth called I; afterwards it was called El;¹ and that must needs me, for the custom of mortals is as a leaf on a branch, which goes away and another comes. On the mountain which rises highest from the wave I was, with pure life and sinful, from the first hour to that which follows the sixth, when the sun changes quadrant."

¹I is here to be pronounced jah; see Psalms, 68. 4.

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy,* PARADISE, XXX [34-99] 152a-d

34. Such, as I leave her for a greater heralding than that of my trumpet, which is bringing its arduous theme to a close, with act and voice of a leader whose talk is accomplished she began again: "We have issued forth from the greatest body to the Heaven which is pure light: light intellectual full of love, love of true good full of joy, joy which transcends every sweetness. Here thou shalt see the one and the other soldiery of Paradise; and the one in those aspects which thou shalt see at the Last Judgment."

46. As a sudden flash which scatters the spirits of the sight so that it deprives the eye of the action of the strongest objects; so did a vivid light shine round about me, leaving me swathed with such a veil of its own effulgence that nothing was visible to me.

52. "The Love which quieteth this Heaven always welcomes to itself with such a salutation, in order to make the candle fit for its flame." No sooner had these brief words come within me than I comprehended that I was surmounting above my own power; and I rekindled me with a new vision, such that no light is so pure that my eyes could not have withstood it. And I saw light in form of a river glowing with effulgence, between two banks painted with marvellous spring. From this stream were issuing living sparks, and on every side were setting themselves in the flowers, like rubies which gold encompasses. Then, as if inebriated by the odors, they plunged again into the wonderful flood, and as one was entering another was issuing forth.

70. "The high desire which now inflames and urges thee to have knowledge concerning that which thou seest, pleases me the more the more it swells; but thou must needs drink of this water before so great a thirst in thee be slaked." Thus the Sun of my eyes said to me; then added: "The stream, and the topazes which enter and issue, and the smiling of the herbage, are shadowy prefaces of their truth; not that these things are difficult in themselves, but there is defect on thy part that thou hast not yet vision so exalted."

82. There is no babe who so hastily springs with face toward the milk, if he awake much later than his wont, as I did, to make yet better mirrors of my eyes, stooping to the wave which flows in order that we may be bettered in it. And even as the eaves of my eyelids drank of it, so it seemed to me from its length to have become round. Then as folk who have been under masks, who seem other than before, if they divest themselves of the semblance not their own wherein they disappeared, in such wise for me the flowers and the sparks were changed into greater festival, so that I saw both the Courts of Heaven made manifest.

97. O splendor of God, through which I saw the high triumph of the true kingdom, give to me power to tell how I saw it!

# **23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART I, 54b; 78d-79a; 79d-80b passim; PART II, 162a-163b; PART III, 172d-173a; 183d-184a**

23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART I, 54b

Whatsoever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say anything is infinite, we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named, having no conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive Him (for He is incomprehensible, and His greatness and power are unconceivable), but that we may honour Him. Also because whatsoever, as I said before, we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once, or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive anything, but he must conceive it in some place; and endued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that anything is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two or more things can be in one and the same place at once: for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense, but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit, without any signification at all, from deceived philosophers and deceived, or deceiving. Schoolmen.

23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART I, 78d-79a

Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of Him in their mind answerable to His nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there which men call fire and is the cause of the heat he feels, but cannot imagine what it is like, nor have an idea of it in his mind such as they have that see it: so also, by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God, and yet not have an idea or image of Him in his mind.

And they that make little or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible, and to stand in awe of their own imaginations, and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks, making the creatures of their own fancy their gods. By which means it hath come to pass that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible is the natural seed of that which every one in himself calleth religion; and in them that worship or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.

And this seed of religion, having been observed by many, some of those that have observed it have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws; and to add to it, of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events by which they thought they should best be able to govern others and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.

23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART I, 79d-80b passim

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse either of their good or evil fortune but some power or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was that some of the old poets said that the gods were at first created by human fear: which, spoken of the gods (that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles), is very true. But the acknowledging of one God eternal, infinite, and omnipotent may more easily be derived from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues and operations, than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that, from any effect he seeth come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes, shall at last come to this, that there must be (as even the heathen philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a first and an eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all this without thought of their fortune, the solicitude whereof both inclines to fear and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods as there be men that feign them.

And for the matter, or substance, of the invisible agents, so fancied, they could not by natural cogitation fall upon any other concept but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dream to one that sleepeth; or in a looking-glass to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real and external substances, and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them imagines and umbrae; and thought them spirits (that is, thin aerial bodies), and those invisible agents, which they feared, to be like them, save that they appear and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit and incorporeal, yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them: and therefore, men that by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgement of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God choose rather to confess He is incomprehensible and above their understanding than to define His nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood, but piously, to honour Him with attributes of significations as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.

Then, for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guess by but by observing and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event any dependence or connexion at all: and therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in diverse other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them, as charming, and conjuring (the liturgy of witches); insomuch as to believe they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.

23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART II, 162a-163b

Again, there is a public and a private worship.

Public is the worship that a Commonwealth performeth, as one person. Private is that which a private person exhibiteth. Public, in respect of the whole Commonwealth, is free; but in respect of particular men it is not so. Private is in secret free; but in the sight of the multitude it is never without some restraint, either from the laws or from the opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of liberty.

The end of worship amongst men is power. For where a man seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerful, and is the readier to obey him; which makes his power greater. But God has no ends: the worship we do him proceeds from our duty and is directed according to our capacity by those rules of honour that reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, for fear of damage, or in thankfulness for good already received from them.

That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of nature, I will begin with His attributes. Where, first, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to Him existence: for no man can have the will to honour that which he thinks not to have any being.

Secondly, that those philosophers who said the world, or the soul of the world, was God spake unworthily of Him, and denied His existence: for by God is understood the cause of the world; and to say the world is God is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.

Thirdly, to say the world was not created, but eternal, seeing that which is eternal has no cause, is to deny there is a God.

Fourthly, that they who, attributing, as they think, ease to God, take from Him the care of mankind, take from Him his honour: for it takes away men's love and fear of Him, which is the root of honour.

Fifthly, in those things that signify greatness and power, to say He is finite is not to honour Him: for it is not a sign of the will to honour God to attribute to Him less than we can; and finite is less than we can, because to finite it is easy to add more.

Therefore to attribute figure to Him is not honour; for all figure is finite:

Nor to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an idea of Him in our mind; for whatsoever we conceive is finite:

Nor to attribute to Him parts or totality; which are the attributes only of things finite:

Nor to say He is in this or that place; for whatsoever is in place is bounded and finite:

Nor that He is moved or resteth; for both these attributes ascribe to Him place:

Nor that there be more gods than one, because it implies them all finite; for there cannot be more than one infinite:

Nor to ascribe to Him (unless metaphorically, meaning not the passion, but the effect) passions that partake of grief; as repentance, anger, mercy: or of want; as appetite, hope, desire; or of any passive faculty: for passion is power limited by somewhat else.

And therefore when we ascribe to God a will, it is not to be understood, as that of man, for a rational appetite; but as the power by which He effecteth everything.

Likewise when we attribute to Him sight, and other acts of sense; as also knowledge and understanding; which in us is nothing else but a tumult of the mind, raised by external things that press the organical parts of man's body: for there is no such thing in God, and, being things that depend on natural causes, cannot be attributed to Him.

He that will attribute to God nothing but what is warranted by natural reason must either use such negative attributes as infinite, eternal, incomprehensible; or superlatives, as most high, most great, and the like; or indefinite, as good, just, holy, creator; and in such sense as if He meant not to declare what He is (for that were to circumscribe Him within the limits of our fancy), but how much we admire Him, and how ready we would be to obey Him; which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honour Him as much as we can: for there is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is I AM; and but one name of His relation to us, and that is God, in which is contained father, king, and lord.

Concerning the actions of divine worship, it is a most general precept of reason that they be signs of the intention to honour God; such as are, first, prayers: for not the carvers, when they made images, were thought to make them gods, but the people that prayed to them.

Secondly, thanksgiving; which differeth from prayer in divine worship no otherwise than that prayers precede, and thanks succeed, the benefit, the end both of the one and the other being to acknowledge God for author of all benefits as well past as future.

Thirdly, gifts; that is to say, sacrifices and oblations, if they be of the best, are signs of honour, for they are thanksgivings.

Fourthly, not to swear by any but God is naturally a sign of honour, for it is a confession that God only knoweth the heart and that no man's wit or strength can protect a man against God's vengeance on the perjured.

Fifthly, it is a part of rational worship to speak considerately of God, for it argues a fear of Him, and fear is a confession of His power. Hence followeth, that the name of God is not to be used rashly and to no purpose; for that is as much as in vain: and it is to no purpose unless it be by way of oath, and by order of the Commonwealth, to make judgements certain; or between Commonwealths, to avoid war. And that disputing of God's nature is contrary to His honour, for it is supposed that in this natural kingdom of God, there is no other way to know anything but by natural reason; that is, from the principles of natural science; which are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living. And therefore, when men out of the principles of natural reason dispute of the attributes of God, they but dishonour Him: for in the attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the signification of philosophical truth, but the signification of pious intention to do Him the greatest honour we are able. From the want of which consideration have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the nature of God that tend not to His honour, but to the honour of our own wits and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate and vain abuses of His sacred name.

Sixthly, in prayers, thanksgiving, offerings and sacrifices, it is a dictate of natural reason that they be every one in his kind the best and most significant of honour. As, for example, that prayers and thanksgiving be made in words and phrases not sudden, nor light, nor plebeian, but beautiful and well composed; for else we do not God as much honour as we can. And therefore the heathens did absurdly to worship images for gods, but their doing it in verse, and with music, both of voice and instruments, was reasonable. Also that the beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the gifts they offered, and their actions in worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.

Seventhly, reason directeth not only to worship God in secret, but also, and especially, in public, and in the sight of men: for without that, that which in honour is most acceptable, the procuring others to honour Him is lost.

Lastly, obedience to His laws (that is, in this case to the laws of nature) is the greatest worship of all. For as obedience is more acceptable to God than sacrifice; so also to set light by His commandments is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the laws of that divine worship which natural reason dictateth to private men.

23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART III, 172d-173a

Other signification of spirit I find nowhere any; and where none of these can satisfy the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not under human understanding; and our faith therein consisteth, not in our opinion, but in our submission; as in all places where God is said to be a Spirit; or where by the Spirit of God is meant God Himself. For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what He is, but only that He is; and therefore the attributes we give Him are not to tell one another what He is, nor to signify our opinion of His nature, but our desire to honour Him with such names as we conceive most honourable amongst ourselves.

"The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."¹ Here if by the Spirit of God be meant God Himself, then is motion attributed to God, and consequently place, which are intelligible only of bodies, and not of substances incorporeal; and so the place is above our understanding that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension is body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place, where when the earth was covered with waters, as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, and again to discover the dry land, useth the like words, "I will bring my Spirit upon the earth, and the waters shall be diminished":² in which place by Spirit is understood a wind (that is an air or spirit moved), which might be called, as in the former place, the Spirit of God, because it was God's work.

Pharaoh calleth the wisdom of Joseph the Spirit of God. For Joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, "Can we find such a man as this is, in whom is the Spirit of God?"³ And Exodus, 28.3, "Thou shalt speak," saith God, "to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdom, to make Aaron garments, to consecrate him." Where extraordinary understanding, though but in making garments, as being the gift of God, is called the Spirit of God. The same is found again, Exod. 31. 3-6, and 35. 31. And Isaiah, 11. 2, 3, where the prophet, speaking of the Messiah, saith, "The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel, and fortitude, and the spirit of the fear of the Lord." Where manifestly is meant, not so many ghosts, but so many eminent graces that God would give him.

¹Genesis, 1. 2.

²Genesis, 8. 1.

³Ibid., 41. 38.

23 HOBBEs: *Leviathan,* PART III, 183d-184a

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word prophet; yet is that the most frequent in which it is taken for him to whom God speaketh immediately that which the prophet is to say from Him to some other man, or to the people. And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God speaketh to such a prophet. Can it, may some say, be properly said that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said He hath a tongue or other organs as a man? The Prophet David argueth thus, "Shall He that made the eye, not see? or He that made the ear, not hear?"¹⁰ But this may be spoken, not, as usually, to signify God's nature, but to signify our intention to honour Him. For to see and hear are honourable attributes, and may be given to God to de-

¹⁰Psalms, 94. 9.

dare, as far as our capacity can conceive His almighty power. But if it were to be taken in the strict and proper sense, one might argue from his making of all other parts of man's body that he had also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to Him. Therefore we are to interpret God's speaking to men immediately for that way, whatsoever it be, by which God makes them understand His will: and the ways whereby He doth this are many, and to be sought only in the Holy Scripture; where though many times it be said that God spake to this and that person, without declaring in what manner, yet there be again many places that deliver also the signs by which they were to acknowledge His presence and commandment; and by these may be understood how He spake to many of the rest.

In what manner God spake to Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and Noah is not expressed; nor how he spake to Abraham, till such time as he came out of his own country to Sichem in the land of Canaan, and then God is said to have appeared to him.¹ So there is one way whereby God made His presence manifest; that is, by an apparition, or vision. And again, the word of the Lord came to Abraham in a vision";² that is to say, somewhat, as a sign of God's presence, appeared as God's messenger to speak to him. Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham by an apparition of three angels;³ and to Abimelech in a dream;⁴ to Lot by an apparition of two angels;⁵ and to Hagar by the apparition of one angel;⁶ and to Abraham again by the apparition of a voice from heaven;⁷ and to Isaac in the night⁸ (that is, in his sleep, or by dream); and to Jacob in a dream;⁹ that is to say (as are the words of the text), "Jacob dreamed that he saw a ladder," etc. And in a vision of angels;¹⁰" and to Moses in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush;¹¹ and after the time of Moses, where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testa-

¹Genesis, 12. 7.

²Genesis, 15. 1.

³Ibid., 18. I.

⁴Ibid., 20. 3.

⁵Ibid., 19. 1.

⁶Ibid., 21. 17.

⁷Ibid., 22. 1 1.

⁸Ibid., 26. 24.

⁹Ibid., 28. 12.

¹⁰Ibid., 32. 1

¹¹Exodus, 3. 2.

ment is expressed. He spake always by a vision, or by a dream; as to Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel, and the rest of the prophets; and often in the New Testament, as to Joseph, to St. Peter, to St. Paul, and to St. John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.

# **25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays,* 238d-239b**

Our strength is so far from being able to comprehend the divine height, that of the works of our Creator those best bear His mark and are best His, which we the least understand. To meet with an incredible thing, is an occasion with Christians to believe.⁴ It is all the more reason that it is against human reason; if it were according to reason, it would no longer be a miracle; if it had an example, it would be no longer

⁴Credo quia impossibile.—St. Augustine.

a singular thing. Melius scitur Deus nesciendo,¹ says St. Augustine; and Tacitus, Sanctius est ac reverentius de actisDeorum credere quam scire;² and Plato thinks there is something of impiety in inquiring too curiously into God, the world, and the first causes of things: atque ilium quidem parentem hujus universitatis invenire, difficile; et quam jam inveneris, indicare in vulgus, nefas,³ says Cicero. We pronounce, indeed, power, truth, justice, which are words that signify some great thing; but that thing we neither see nor conceive. We say that God fears, that God is angry, that God loves,

lmmortalia mortali sermone notantes:⁴

which are all agitations and emotions that cannot be in God, according to our form, nor can we imagine it, according to His. It only belongs to God to know Himself, and to interpret His own works; and He does it in our language, to stoop and descend to us who grovel upon the earth. How can Prudence, which is the choice betwixt good and evil, be properly attributed to Him, whom no evil can touch? How the reason and intelligence, which we make use of, so as by obscure to arrive at apparent things, seeing that nothing is obscure to Him? and justice, which distributes to every one what appertains to him, a thing created by the society and communitv of men: how is that in God? how temperance? How the moderation of corporal pleasures, that have no place in the divinity? Fortitude to support pain, labour, and dangers, as little appertains to Him as the rest, these three things having no access to Him: for which reason Aristotle holds Him⁵ equally exempt from virtue and vice: neque gratia neque ira teneri potest; quod quae talia essent, imbecilla essent omnia.⁶

The participation we have in the knowledge of truth, such as it is, is not acquired by our own force: God has sufficiently given us to understand that by the testimony He has chosen out

¹God is better known by not knowing.—St. Augustine, De Ordine, ii. 16.

²It is more holy and reverend to believe the works of God, than to know them.—Tacitus, De Mor. Germ., xxxiv.

³To find out the parent of the world is very hard: and when found out, to reveal him to the vulgar, is sin.—Cicero, translation from the Timaeus.

⁴Giving to things immortal mortal names.—Lucretius, v. 1 22.

⁵Ethics, vii. 1.

⁶He can be affected neither with favour nor indignation, because both those are the effects'of frailty.— Cicero, De Nat. Deor., i. 17.

of the common people, simple and ignorant men, whom He has been pleased to employ to instruct us in His admirable secrets. Our faith is not of our own acquiring, 'tis purely the gift of another's bounty; 'tis not by meditation or by virtue of our own understanding that we have acquired our religion, but by foreign authority and command; the weakness of our judgment more assists us than force, and our blindness more than our clearness of sight; 'tis rather by the mediation of our ignorance than of our knowledge that we know anything of the divine Wisdom. 'Tis no wonder if our natural and earthly means cannot conceive that supernatural and heavenly knowledge: let us bring nothing of our own, but obedience and subjection; for, as it is written, "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? For after that in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe."

# **28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation, 443c**

Moreover, as I have said, I neither hold this arrangement of the faculties of the vital principle, which Fabricius has placed at the head of his account of the organs of generation, as correct in itself, nor as useful or calculated to assist us in the matter we have in hand. For we do not attain to a knowledge of effects from a discussion of actions or faculties; the contrary is rather the case: from actions we ascend to a knowledge of faculties, inasmuch as manifestations are more cognizable to us than the powers whence they proceed, and the parts which we investigate already formed are more readily appreciated than the actions whence they proceed.

Neither is it well from the generation of a single chick from an egg, to venture upon general conclusions, which can in fact only be correctly arrived at after extensive observations on the mode of generation among animals at large. But of this matter I shall have more to say immediately.

# **31 SPINOZA: *Ethics,* PART I, PROP 17, SCHOL 362c-363c**

Schol. There are some who think that God is a free cause because He can, as they think, bring about that those things which we have said follow from His nature—that is to say, those things which are in His power—should not be, or should not be produced by Him. But this is simply saying that God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles should be equal to two right angles, or that from a given cause an effect should not follow, which is absurd. But I shall show farther on, without the help of this proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God.

I know, indeed, that there are many who think themselves able to demonstrate that intellect of the highest order and freedom of will both pertain to the nature of God, for they say that they know nothing more perfect which they can attribute to Him than that which is the chief perfection in ourselves. But although they conceive God as actually possessing the highest intellect, they nevertheless do not believe that He can bring about that all those things should exist which are actually in His intellect, for they think that by such a supposition they would destroy His power. If He had created, they say, all things which are in His intellect, He could have created nothing more, and this, they believe, does not accord with God's omnipotence so then they prefer to consider God as indifferent to all things, and creating nothing excepting that which He has decreed to create by a certain absolute will. But I think that I have shown with sufficient clearness (Prop. 16) that from the supreme power of God, or from His infinite nature, infinite things in infinite ways, that is to say, all things, have necessarily flowed, or continually follow by the same necessity, in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle, from eternity and to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. The omnipotence of God has therefore been actual from eternity, and in the same actuality will remain to eternity. In this way the omnipotence of God, in my opinion, is far more firmly established. My adversaries, indeed (if I may be permitted to speak plainly), seem to deny the omnipotence of God, inasmuch as they are forced to admit that He has in His mind an infinite number of things which might be created, but which, nevertheless, He will inner be able to create, for if He were to create all things which He has in His mind, He would, according to them, exhaust His omnipotence and make Himself imperfect. Therefore, in order to make a perfect God, they are compelled to make Him incapable of doing all those things to which His power extends, and anything more absurd than this, or more opposed to God's omnipotence, I do not think can be imagined. Moreover—to say a word, too, here about the intellect and will which we commonly attribute to God—if intellect and will pertain to His eternal essence, these attributes cannot be understood in the sense in which men generally use them, for the intellect and will which could constitute His essence would have to differ entirely from our intellect and will, and could resemble ours in nothing except in name. There could be no further likeness than that between the celestial constellation of the Dog and the animal which barks. This I will demonstrate as follows. If intellect pertains to the divine nature, it cannot, like our intellect, follow the things which are its object (as many suppose), nor can it be simultaneous in its nature with them, since God is prior to all things in casuality (Corol. 1, Prop. 16) ; but, on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is, because as such it exists objectively in God's intellect. Therefore the intellect of God, in so far as it is conceived to constitute His essence, is in truth the cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence,—a truth which seems to have been understood by those who have maintained that God's intellect, will, and power are one and the same thing. Since, therefore, God's intellect is the sole cause of things, both of their essence and of their existence (as we have already shown), it must necessarily differ from them with regard both to its essence and existence; for an effect differs from its cause precisely in that which it has from its cause. For example, one man is the cause of the existence but not of the essence of another, for the essence is an eternal truth; and therefore with regard to essence the two men may exactly resemble one another, but with regard to existence they must differ. Consequently if the existence of one should perish, that of the other will not therefore perish; but if the essence of one could be destroyed and become false, the essence of the other would be likewise destroyed. Therefore a thing which is the cause both of the essence and of the existence of any effect must differ from that effect both with regard to its essence and with regard to its existence. But the intellect of God is the cause both of the essence and existence of our intellect; therefore the intellect of God, so far as it is conceived to constitute the divine essence, differs from our intellect both with regard to its essence and its existence, nor can it coincide with our intellect in anything except the name, which is what we essayed to prove. The same demonstration may be applied to the will, as anyone may easily see for himself.

Prop. 18. God is the immanent, and not the transitive cause of all things.

Demonst. All things which are, are in God and must be conceived through Him (Prop. 15), and therefore (Corol. 1, Prop. 16) He is the cause of the things which are in Himself. This is the first thing which was to be proved. Moreover, outside God there can be no substance (Prop. 14), that is to say (Def. 3), outside Him nothing can exist which is in itself. This was the second thing to be proved. God, therefore, is the immanent, but not the transitive cause of all things, q.e.d.

Prop. 19. God is eternal, or, in other words, all His attributes are eternal.

Demonst. For God (Def. 6) is substance, which (Prop. 11) necessarily exists, that is to say (Prop. 7), a substance to whose nature it pertains to exist, or (which is the same thing) a substance from the definition of which it follows that it exists, and therefore (Def. 8) He is eternal. Again, by the attributes of God is to be understood that which (Def. 4) expresses the essence of the divine substance, that is to say, that which pertains to substance. It is this, I say, which the attributes themselves must involve. But eternity pertains to the nature of substance (Prop. 7). Therefore each of the attributes must involve eternity, and therefore all are eternal, q.e.d.

Schol. This proposition is as clear as possible, too, from the manner in which (Prop. 11) I have demonstrated the existence of God. From that demonstration I say it is plain that the existence of God, like His essence, is an eternal truth. Moreover (Prop. 19 of the "Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy"), I have demonstrated by another method the eternity of God, and there is no need to repeat the demonstration here.

# **34 NEWTON: *Principles,* BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 370a-371a**

This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world, but as Lord over all; and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God παντοκρά-τωρ, or Universal Ruler; for God is a relative word, and has a respect to servants; and Deity is the dominion of God not over his own body, as those imagine who fancy God to be the soul of the world, but over servants. The Supreme God is a Being eternal, infinite, absolutely perfect; but a being, however perfect, without dominion, cannot be said to be Lord God; for we say, my God, your God, the God of Israel, the God of Gods, and Lord of Lords; but we do not say, my Eternal, your Eternal, the Eternal of Israel, the Eternal of Gods; we do not say, my Infinite, or my Perfect: these are titles which have no respect to servants. The word God¹ usually signifies Lord; but every lord is not a God. It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God: a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme, or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and, from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures forever, and is everywhere present; and, by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes duration and space. Since every particle of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere, certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be never and nowhere. Every soul that has perception is, though in different times and in different organs of sense and motion, still the same indivisible person. There are given successive parts in duration, coexistent parts in space, but neither the one nor the other in the person of a man, or his thinking principle; and much less can they be found in the thinking substance of God. Every man, so far as he is a thing that has perception, is one and the same man during his whole life, in all and each of his organs of sense. God is the same God, always and everywhere. He is omnipresent not virtually only, but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without substance. In him² are all things contained and moved; yet neither affects the other: God suffers nothing from the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of God. It is allowed by all that the Supreme God exists necessarily; and by the same necessity he

¹Dr. Pocock derives the Latin word Deus from the Arabic du (in the oblique case di), which signifies Lord. And in this sense princes are called gods, Psalms, 82.6; and John, 10.35. And Moses is called a god to his brother Aaron, and a god to Pharaoh, Exodus, 4.16; and 7.1. And in the same sense the souls of dead princes were formerly, by the heathens, called gods, but falsely, because of their want of dominion.

²This was the opinion of the ancients. So Pythagoras, in Cicero De natura deorum i. Thales, Anaxagoras, Virgil, in Georgics iv. 220; and Aeneid vi. 721. Philo, Allegories, at the beginning of Book I. Aratus, in his Phaenomena, at the beginning. So also the sacred writers: as St. Paul, in Acts, 17.27, 28. St. John's Gospel, 14.2. Moses, in Deuteronomy, 4.39; and 10.14. David, in Psalms, 139.7,8,9. Solomon, in I Kings, 8.27. Job, 22.12,13,14. Jeremiah, 23.23,24. The idolaters supposed the sun, moon, and stars, the souls of men, and other parts of the world, to be parts of the Supreme God, and therefore to be worshipped; but erroneously.

exists always and everywhere. Whence also he is all similar, all eye, all ear, all brain, all arm, all power to perceive, to understand, and to act; but in a manner not at all human, in a manner not at all corporeal, in a manner utterly unknown to us. As a blind man has no idea of colors, so have we no idea of the manner by which the all-wise God perceives and understands all things. He is utterly void of all body and bodily figure, and can therefore neither be seen, nor heard, nor touched; nor ought he to be worshiped under the representation of any corporeal thing. We have ideas of his attributes, but what the real substance of anything is we know not. In bodies, we see only their figures and colors, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their outward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savors; but their inward substances are not to be known either by our senses, or by any reflex act of our minds: much less, than, have we any idea of the substance of God. We know him only by his most wise and excellent contrivances of things, and final causes; we admire him for his perfections; but we reverence and adore him on account of his dominion: for we adore him as his servants; and a god without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing else but Fate and Nature. Blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could produce no variety of things. All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing. But, by way of allegory, God is said to see, to speak, to laugh, to love, to hate, to desire, to give, to receive, to rejoice, to be angry, to fight, to frame, to work, to build; for all our notions of God are taken from the ways of mankind by a certain similitude, which, though not perfect, has some likeness, however. And thus much concerning God; to discourse of whom from the appearances of things, does certainly belong to natural philosophy.

Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very centres of the sun and planets, T\dthout suffering the least diminution of its force; that operates not according to the quantity of the surfaces of the particles upon which it acts (as mechanical causes used to do), but according to the quantity of the solid matter which they contain, and propagates its virtue on all sides to immense distances, decreasing always as the inverse square of the distances. Gravitation towards the sun is made up out of the gravitations towards the several particles of which the body of the sun is composed; and in receding from the sun decreases accurately as the inverse square of the distances as far as the orbit of Saturn, as evidently appears from the quiescence of the aphelion of the planets; nay, and even to the remotest aphelion of the comets, if those aphelions are also quiescent. But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.

# **35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding,* BK II, CH XIII, SECT 18 152a-c**

18. Different meanings of substance. I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations. Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, substance, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite, incomprehensible God, to finite spirits, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will thence follow—that God, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different modification of that substance; as a tree and a pebble, being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter, which will be a very harsh doctrine.¹ If they say, that they apply it to God, finite spirit, and matter, in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when God is said to be a substance; for another when the soul is called substance; and for a third when body is called so;—if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification. And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

# **38 ROUSSEAU: *Social Contract,* BK IV, 435b**

The fancy the Greeks had for rediscovering their gods among the barbarians arose from the way they had of regarding themselves as the natural Sovereigns of such peoples. But there is nothing so absurd as the erudition which in our days identifies and confuses gods of different nations. As if Moloch, Saturn, and Chronos could be the same god! As if the Phoenician Baal, the Greek Zeus, and the Latin Jupiter could be the same! As if there could still be anything common to imaginary beings with different names!

If it is asked how in pagan times, where each State had its cult and its gods, there were no wars of religion, I answer that it was precisely because each State, having its own cult as well as its own government, made no distinction between its gods and its laws. Political war was also theological; the provinces of the gods were, so to speak, fixed by the boundaries oi nations. The god of one people had no right over another. The gods of the pagans were not jealous gods; they shared among themselves the empire of the world: even Moses and the Hebrews sometimes lent themselves to this view by speaking of the God of Israel. It is true, they regarded as powerless the gods of the Canaanites, a proscribed people condemned to destruction, whose place they were to take; but remember how they spoke of the divisions of the neighbouring peoples they were forbidden to attack! "Is not the possession of what belongs to your god Chamos lawfully your due?" said Jephthah to the Ammonites. "We have the same title to the lands our conquering God has made his own."² Here, I think, there is a recognition that the rights of Chamos and those of the God of Israel are of the same nature.

²Nonne ea quce possidet Chamos deus tuus, tibi jure debentur? (Judges, n. 24.) Such is the text in the Vulgate. Father de Carrieres translates: "Do you not regard yourselves as having a right to what your god possesses?" I do not know the force of the Hebrew text: but I perceive that, in the Vulgate, Jephthah positively recognises the right of the god Chamos, and that the French translator weakened this admission by inserting an "according to you," which is not in the Latin.

# **42 KANT: *Pure Reason,* 176a-b**

The possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived—except that of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be considered to be primitive and original. For all negations—and they are the only predicates by means of which all other things can be distinguished from the ens realissimum—are mere limitations of a greater and a higher—nay, the highest reality; and they consequently presuppose this reality, and are, as regards their content, derived from it. The manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various mode of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common substratum; just as all figures are possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The object of the ideal of reason —an object existing only in reason itself—is also termed the primal being (ens originarium) ; as having no existence superior to him, the supreme being (ens summum) ; and as being the condition of all other beings, which rank under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But none of these terms indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to other things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and all our investigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with regard to the existence of this being.

A primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an existence which is derivative, for the latter presuppose the former, and therefore cannot be constitutive parts of it. It follows that the ideal of the primal being must be cogitated as simple.

The deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal being cannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation, or as a kind of division of its reality; for this would be regarding the primal being as a mere aggregate —which has been shown to be impossible, although it was so represented in our first rough sketch. The highest reality must be regarded rather as the ground than as the sum-total of the possibility of all things, and the manifold nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the primal being itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from it. And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality, may be with propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects, while they could not have formed parts of the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing this track, and hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves authorized to determine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the mere conception of a highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, and so on—in one word, to determine it in its unconditioned completeness by the aid of every possible predicate. The conception of such a being is the conception of God in its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a transcendental theology.

# **47 GOETHE: *Faust,* PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b esp [3455-3457] 84b**

47 GOETHE: *Faust,* PART I [3432-3468] 84a-b

Who dare name Him?

And who avow:

"I believe in Him"?

Who feels and would 3435

Have hardihood

To say: "I don't believe in Him"?

The All-Enfolder,

The All-Upholder,

Enfolds, upholds He not 3440

You, me, Himself?

Do not the heavens over-arch us yonder?

Does not the earth lie firm beneath?

Do not eternal stars rise friendly

Looking down upon us? 3445

Look I not, eye in eye, on you,

And do not all things throng

Toward your head and heart,

Weaving in mystery eternal,

Invisible, visible, near to you? 3450

Fill up your heart with it, great though it is,

And when you're wholly in the feeling, in its bliss,

Name it then as you will,

Name it Happiness! Heart! Love! God!

I have no name for that! 3455

Feeling is all in all;

Name is but sound and smoke,

Beclouding Heaven's glow.

Margaret. That's all quite nice and good to know;

Much the same way the preacher talks of it, 3460

Only in words that differ just a bit.

Faust. Wherever the light of Heaven doth shine,

All hearts repeat it, everywhere, and each

In its own speech;

Then why not I in mine? 3465

Margaret. To hear it thus, it's passable, and still I doubt it;

In spite of it all there is some hitch about it,

For you have no Christianity.

47 GOETHE: *Faust,* PART I esp [3455-3457] 84b

I have no name for that! 3455

Feeling is all in all;

Name is but sound and smoke,

# **51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace,* BK VI, 248d**

After this, three pages were left blank in the diary, and then the following was written:

I have had a long and instructive talk alone with Brother V., who advised me to hold fast by Brother A. Though I am unworthy, much was revealed to me. Adonai is the name of the creator of the world. Elohim is the name of the ruler of all. The third name is the name unutterable which means the All. Talks with Brother V. strengthen, refresh, and support me in the path of virtue. In his presence doubt has no place. The distinction between the poor teachings of mundane science and our sacred all-embracing teaching is clear to me. Human sciences dissect everything to comprehend it, and kill everything to examine it. In the holy science of our order all is one, all is known in its entirety and life. The Trinity—the three elements of matter— are sulphur, mercury, and salt. Sulphur is of an oily and fiery nature; in combination with salt by its fiery nature it arouses a desire in the latter by means of which it attracts mercury, seizes it, holds it, and in combination produces other bodies. Mercury is a fluid, volatile, spiritual essence. Christ, the Holy Spirit, Him! . . .